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No Direction Home: Will The Law Keep Pace 
With Human Tracking Technology to Protect 
Individual Privacy and Stop Geoslavery? 
WILLIAM A. HERBERT∗ 
ABSTRACT 
Increasingly, public and private employers are utilizing human 
tracking devices to monitor employee movement and conduct.  Due 
to the propensity of American labor law to give greater weight to 
employer property interests over most employee privacy 
expectations, there are currently few limitations on the use of 
human tracking in employment.  The scope and nature of current 
legal principles regarding individual privacy are not sufficient to 
respond to the rapid development and use of human tracking 
technology.  The academic use of the phrase “geoslavery” to 
describe the abusive use of such technology underscores its power.  
This article examines the use of such technology under current 
federal and state law and suggests potential means for developing 
greater legal protections against the abusive use of the technology 
and the intrusion into personal privacy.  
INTRODUCTION 
 The creation and increased use of various forms of human tracking 
technology by governmental entities, private entities and individuals 
raise profound policy and legal issues for our society.  The scope of 
constitutional, legislative or administrative limitations on the use of 
such technology reflects on our society’s concepts of freedom, 
individual autonomy, and protected privacy.  As technology advances, 
it expands the means for privacy intrusions, thereby limiting the 
personal secrets and confidences that can be concealed.  New 
technological tools diminish the ability of individuals to maintain a 
protected zone against physical, sensational, informational, and cyber 
intrusions.  The growing availability and use of human tracking 
technology diminishes privacy interests that may precipitate societal 
demands for increased legal protections. 
 How freedom and privacy are defined today has substantive 
consequences in the legal measures that will be devised and applied to 
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protect those interests.  As Columbia University historian Eric Foner 
has shown, the concept and boundaries of freedom have changed over 
the course of American history.  Throughout our history, the definition 
of freedom has been constantly redefined but has always been subject 
to a balance between individual rights and property rights, as well as a 
balance between the right of the individual and the power of the state.1  
Similar balances are applicable in how the contours of protected 
individual privacy are defined. 
 In order to respond to the power of contemporary human tracking, 
a new societal consensus needs to be reached regarding what 
constitutes privacy and how it can be protected.  At the same time, a 
judgment must be reached regarding whether the legal standards 
applicable to government surveillance under the Constitution should 
be the same for non-governmental surveillance.  
 In contemporary American culture, some view the concept of 
freedom as being manifested in consumerism, with the ubiquitous cell 
phone as a primary symbol.  It is doubtful that most cell phone users 
are aware that the same technology that grants them this sense of 
consumer freedom, also results in wireless companies receiving 
automatic and continuous updates regarding their location.2  Physical 
possession of a cell phone renders an individual vulnerable to location 
surveillance by government entities.  When an employer distributes a 
cell phone for use by an employee, the employee’s location becomes 
subject to location monitoring by the employer on and off the job.  A 
third party who obtains physical access to another person’s cell phone 
can easily transform it into a stalking device by registering it with an 
internet location based service.3  Mass recognition of this non-
negotiated trade of a cellular sense of freedom for perpetual 
 
 
 
 
1
 ERIC FONER, THE STORY OF AMERICAN FREEDOM (1998). 
2
 It is even less probable that cellular customers know or understand the Wireless 
Communications and Public Safety Act of 1999 which places certain restrictions on the use 
and disclosure of customer location information. 47 U.S.C. § 222 (2006).  The Federal 
Communication Commission’s 2002 denial of a petition filed by an industry group and 
supported by privacy advocacy groups seeking commencement of rulemaking to clarify the 
statute’s privacy provisions increased the likelihood of public ignorance or misunderstanding 
regarding the statute’s location information protections. In the Matter of Request by Cellular 
Telecommunications and Internet Association to Commence Rulemaking to Establish Fair 
Location Information Practices F.C.C. 02-208 (2002), available at 
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-02-208A1.pdf. 
3
 Ben Goldacre, How I Stalked My Girlfriend, GUARDIAN, Feb. 1, 2006, 
http://technology.guardian.co.uk/print/0,,5388423-117802,00.html (last visited May 12, 
2006). 
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surveillance may constitute an Achilles heel to the currently 
unregulated location based tracking marketplace. 
 Unlike the debates connected with bioethics and stem cell 
research, the legal and ethical issues connected with human tracking 
technology have not been subjected to a serious and rigorous debate. 
Whether our society is prepared to collectively accept narrow notions 
of privacy and autonomy through electronic location devices remains 
to a large extent unexplored.  Media disclosures of unchecked and 
possibly unlawful use of presidential authority to engage in 
warrantless technologically-based surveillance of Americans may spur 
a more reasoned and spirited societal discussion regarding the impact 
of new technology on personal privacy.4  Such disclosures may render 
useless the political cliché “9/11 changed everything” as justification 
for the erosion of protected privacy interests and other civil liberties.5  
It remains to be seen whether the discussion regarding unchecked 
presidential power will extend to a broader questioning of various 
forms of electronic surveillance.  
 This article will discuss various legal principles and issues 
associated with the use of the following human tracking technologies: 
global positioning system (hereinafter “GPS”),6 radio frequency 
 
 
 
 
4
 Leslie Cauley, NSA has Massive Database of Americans' Phone Calls, USA TODAY, May 
11, 2006, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2006-05-10-nsa_x.htm; 
James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 16, 2005, at A1; Eric Lichtblau & James Risen, Spy Agency Mined Vast Data Trove, 
Officials Report, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 2005, at A1; Matthew L.Wald, Widespread 
Radioactivity Monitoring Is Confirmed, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 2005,  available at 
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5
 JEFFREY ROSEN, THE NAKED CROWD: RECLAIMING SECURITY AND FREEDOM IN AN ANXIOUS 
AGE 55-61 (2004) [hereinafter NAKED CROWD].  Among the many questionable uses of the 
September 11, 2001 tragedy as a rationale for policy changes was the 2004 National Labor 
Relations Board’s decision that cited 9/11 as justification for overturning prior precedent that 
had recognized a statutory right of a private sector employee in an unorganized worksite to be 
represented by a co-worker during a disciplinary interrogation. IBM Corp., Cases 11-CA-
19324, 11-CA-19329, 11-CA-19334, 341 N.L.R.B. No.148, 2004 WL 1335742 (2004).   
6
 GPS is a satellite-based electronic system that provides very precise tracking of objects, 
individuals, and other animals in real time anywhere on the planet. Originally developed by 
the military, GPS technology has been available for civilian use for over twenty years.  
Through triangulation of information from satellite signals, a GPS receiver can determine the 
speed, latitude, and longitude of an object or individual under surveillance. GPS receivers can 
be attached or installed in objects such as vehicles, cell phones, and laptops.  In addition, GPS 
receivers can be carried by, attached to, or implanted in an individual.  April A. Otterberg, 
GPS Tracking Technology: The Case for Revisiting Knotts and Shifting the Supreme Court’s 
Theory of the Public Space Under the Fourth Amendment, 46 B.C.L. REV. 661, 665-666 
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identification (hereinafter “RFID”),7 cellular technology,8 and 
biometrics9 in the public and private sectors.  In addition, it will 
suggest potential solutions aimed at creating a balance between liberty 
and security as they relate to the utilization of human tracking devices.  
The application of such principles and the nature of the solutions will 
depend on the type of tracking device and the context in which the 
device is utilized. For example, the legal rules applicable to mandatory 
or voluntary human implants containing location technology should be 
far more restrictive than limitations placed on an employer utilizing a 
location device to track an employee driving an employer owned 
vehicle during working hours.10  Concerns relating to privacy and 
                                                                                                                   
(2005); Kristin E. Edmundson, Global Positioning System Implants: Must Consumer Privacy 
Be Lost In Order for People to be Found?, 38 IND. L. REV. 207, 209-212 (2005).  
7
 RFID is a radio-based identification system that utilizes tags with computer chips containing 
digital information that can be used to track and identify humans, animals, and inanimate 
objects. The digital information contained in the microchip can be read through the use of an 
RFID reader. There are two types of RFID tags.  An active RFID tag is battery powered and 
emits a regular signal.  In contrast, a passive RFID tag is powered only when in contact with a 
reader. D. Zachary Hostetter, When Small Technology is a Big Deal: Legal Issues Arising 
from Business Use of RFID, 2 SHIDLER J. L. COM. & TECH. 10 (2005), available at 
http://www.lctjournal.washington.edu/Vol2/a010Hostetter.html.  Common uses of RFID 
technology include merchandise inventory control, airline luggage location, electronic tolling 
systems, and human and animal implants.  
8
 There are two different aspects of human tracking technology connected with the cellular 
marketplace.  Following issuance of E-911 rules by the Federal Communications Commission 
in 1997, many cellular companies installed GPS chips in their cell phones.  In addition, the 
location of a powered cell phone can be tracked in real time through the constant and 
automatic communication between the cell phone and cell towers. See Jonathan Krim, FBI 
Dealt Setback on Cellular Surveillance, WASH. POST, Oct. 28, 2005, at A5; Matt Richtel, Live 
Tracking of Mobile Phones Prompts Court Fights On Privacy, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 2005, at 
A1. 
9
 Biometrics refers to computer-based technology that can identify an individual or verify an 
individual’s identity based on unique physical characteristics known as biometric identifiers 
including fingerprint imaging, hand and facial geometries, voice recognition, and iris 
recognition. See Eric Lipton, Hurdles for Technology In U.S. Security Efforts, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 10, 2005, at A14; Peter A. Buxbaum, The Biometrics Dilemma, HOMELAND SEC., 
Jan./Feb., 2005, at 14; 
Paul Rosenzweig, Alane Kochems & Ari Schwartz, Biometric Technologies: Security, Legal, 
and Policy Implications, THE HERITAGE FOUND., June 21, 2004, 
www.heritage.org/research/homelanddefense/lm12.cfm. 
10
 Human implants frequently contain RFID or GPS technology.  The RFID implant is 
approximately the size of a grain of sand and can be placed under the skin of an arm or a hand 
utilizing a syringe.  In 2004, the United States Food and Drug Administration approved the 
marketing of RFID microchips. Barnaby J. Feder & Tom Zeller, Jr., Identity Badge Worn 
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autonomy are greatest when GPS, RFID, cellular technology, and 
biometrics are utilized by the government to conduct surveillance, 
employers to monitor employees, school districts to track their 
students, rental car companies to monitor the use of rented vehicles, 
and parents to keep track of their elusive teenagers.  
 Currently, the contours of protected privacy remain closely linked 
to property rights.  As will be seen, constitutional protections against 
technological invasions into privacy remain strongest inside one’s 
home or apartment with the windows shuttered. Once an individual 
leaves his or her home or is visible inside the home from public space, 
there is a precipitous drop in the scope of legal protections.  
 In contrast, many of us still retain a subjective sense of spatial 
autonomy, even within the eyeshot of the public eye.  The concept that 
one can get lost in a crowd and retain a protected zone of privacy and 
autonomy currently lacks strong legal foundation.  Historically, escape 
to urban areas constituted a means of obtaining anonymity and a new 
identity.11  The growing availability of human tracking technology has 
the probability of eviscerating any subjective sense of personal 
autonomy while outside the home unless there is corrective legislative 
action. 
 In addition, privacy and other public policy concerns stem from 
the potential vulnerability of such technologies to hacking and third-
party access.  A major source of opposition to the United States State 
Department’s plan to introduce an electronic passport program 
utilizing RFID technology came from those concerned about hacking 
and surreptitious third-party reading of the information contained in 
the microchip.12  At the Fourth Annual IEEE International Conference 
on Pervasive Computing and Communications in Pisa, Italy in 2006, a 
computer science research group from Vrije Universiteit in 
Amsterdam presented a paper identifying potential scenarios involving 
the vulnerability of RFID tags to worms and viruses.13 Other computer 
                                                                                                                   
Under Skin Approved for Use In Health Care, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 2004 available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/10/14/technology/14implant.html?ei=5070&en=aea96eac9d8c
161b&ex=1148529600&adxnnl=1&adxnnlx=1148425670-YYyCA2+3RCqgnWPBR6be3g. 
11
 JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN & LOREN SCHWENINGER, RUNAWAY SLAVES: REBELS ON THE 
PLANTATION 124-148 (1999).   
12
 Electronic Passport, 70 Fed. Reg. 61,553-01 (Oct. 25, 2005) (to be codified at 22 C.F.R. pt. 
51). 
13
 Melanie R. Rieback, Bruno Crispo & Andrew S. Tanenbaum, Is Your Cat Infected with a 
Computer Virus?, http://www.rfidvirus.org/papers/percom.06.pdf; John Markoff, Study Says 
Chips in ID Tags Are Vulnerable to Viruses, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2006, at C3. 
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researchers have demonstrated an ability to hack and clone RFID 
information.14  Nevertheless, countries such as China and the United 
Kingdom are introducing national identification cards containing 
RFID technology.15 
 Important legal and policy issues also arise in the context of 
individual volitional use of tracking technology for safety and 
convenience.  The utilization of new technological gadgets can result 
in unwanted or unanticipated third party surveillance and unforeseen 
negative consequences such as stalking.  Although many motorists 
enjoy the efficiency of electronic tollbooths and “smart highways,” 
such enjoyment may abruptly end if, or when the government begins 
to issue speeding tickets premised on the electronic information that 
calculates the average speed of a trip between two electronic points.16   
The federal government is currently funding state studies regarding the 
use of GPS tracking on toll roads to develop “mileage-based road user 
fees.”17  In addition, the popularity of mass transit fare cards with 
RFID chips may decline when passengers learn that their location and 
movements can be tracked.18 
 GPS and cellular technology are being utilized for the care of 
Alzheimer’s patients and to enable parents to monitor the location of 
 
 
 
 
14
 Robert Lemos, RFID tags become hacker target, CNET NEWS.COM, July 28, 2004, 
http://news.com.com/RFID+tags+become+hacker+target/2100-1029_3-5287912.html.  
15
 Sumner Lemon, China to issue 1.3 billion RFID identification cards, IDG NEWS SERV., 
Mar. 9, 2006, http://www.infoworld.com/article/06/03/09/76259_HNchinarfidcards_1.html; 
Oliver King, New ID cards defeat for government, GUARDIAN, Mar. 6, 2006, 
http://politics.guardian.co.uk/print/0,,329427960-110247,00.html. 
16
 Christopher Caldwell, A Pass On Privacy?,  N.Y. TIMES MAG., July 17, 2005, at 13-14, 
available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/07/17/magazine/17WWLN.html?ex=1279252800&en=6aa0d4
4b263846f1&ei=5088&partner=rssnyt&emc=rss. 
17
 Declan McCullagh, Perspective: E-tracking, Coming to a DMV Near You, CNET 
NEWS.COM, Dec. 5, 2005, http://news.com.com/E-
tracking%2C+coming+to+a+DMV+near+you/2010-1071_3-5980979.html. In New York, 
over 200 volunteer drivers participated in a federally funded study utilizing GPS devices to 
create a data flow regarding traffic patterns and speeds in a 40-mile radius. Michael Hill, 
Traffic Studied Using Computer-Linked Cars, ABC NEWS, Apr. 24, 2005, 
http://abcnews.go.com/US/print?id=698667. 
18 Oyster Data Uses Rises in Crime Clampdown, GUARDIAN, Mar. 13, 2006, available at 
http://politics.guardian.co.uk/foi/story/0,,1730771,00.html. 
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their children.19  The decreasing expense of GPS devices may tempt 
some to use tracking technology as a replacement for more expensive 
nursing and childcare.20  However, market location devices and 
services do not constitute “magic bullets” that eliminate fears 
regarding the safety and well-being of children and the disabled. 
Satellite-based information regarding the precise location of a patient 
or child is a far less effective means of protection than direct care. 
Furthermore, equipment failure or malfunction in such devices and 
services can increase anxiety, if not panic, for those who choose 
tracking technology over direct supervision and may result in 
increased societal costs connected with police intervention.21 
 The legal implications relating to an individual’s volitional use of a 
tracking device to monitor his or her own whereabouts or for safety 
while driving, hiking, or boating will not be the subject of this article.  
Reasonable people can differ whether individual use of such 
technological devices lead to personal serenity or are necessitated by 
genuine risks to personal safety.22  There are few justifications for 
expansive regulation of an individual’s choice to utilize new 
technological gadgets unless the technology results in unwanted or 
unanticipated third party surveillance, leads to an increase in reckless 
and anti-social behavior, or is used to intrude on the privacy of others.  
 Tracking devices, like other technological developments, can lead 
to unforeseen negative social consequences.23  On the most basic level, 
 
 
 
 
19
 University of Pittsburgh Medical Center, GPS Technology and Alzheimer’s Disease: Novel 
Use for an Existing Technology, U. PITT. MED. CENTER, http://alzheimers.upmc.com/GPS.htm 
(last visited May 13, 2006). 
20
 Rob Pegoraro, Watch Out, Kids: With GPS Phones, Big Mother Is Watching, WASH. POST, 
Apr. 19, 2006, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/04/18/AR2006041801604.html. 
21
 Matt Richtel, Selling Surveillance To Anxious Parents, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 2006, available 
at 
http://tech2.nytimes.com/mem/technology/techreview.html?res=9501EED8113FF930A35756
C0A9609C8B63. 
22For example, author Ted Conover has noted that use of a vehicle GPS device can deprive 
enjoyment “of unmeasured moments of suspension between here and there.” Ted Conover, 
Get Lost, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2005, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/14/opinion/14conover.html?ex=1292216400&en=6d01289e
3e9a5566&ei=5088&partner=rssnyt&emc=rss. 
23
 The great television comic Sid Caesar has observed that the use of television remote control 
devices has led to negative social consequences: “The remote control took over the timing of 
the world.  That’s why you have road rage. You have people who have no patience, because 
you get immediate gratification. You got click, click, click, click.  If it doesn’t explode within 
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the expectation of presumed technological perfection in tracking 
technology can lead to potential panic in the face of a malfunction, 
anxiety when feeling lost along with a general societal decline in 
geographical common sense.  Although automobile travel has existed 
for a century, it is only in recent times that some drivers have 
developed a sense of fear when driving without the availability of a 
cell phone or outside the range of a cellular tower.  Tracking devices 
can lead to the proliferation of dangerous activities such as reckless 
mountain hiking to remote areas or over-exuberant geo-caching 
resulting in police intervention.  Nevertheless, a New York Times 
practical traveler article highlighting the recreational usages of GPS 
technology failed, to discuss the possibility of mechanical failure or 
suggest precautions to avoid unexpected exigencies.24  
 The unforeseen societal impact connected with an expansive use of 
location technology is neither theoretical nor speculative.  In an 
anthropological study of the Inuit people, Professors Claudio Aporta 
and Eric Higgs analyzed the impact GPS technology has had on the 
Inuit traditional orientation and navigational skills in the Arctic 
environment.25  Historically, the Intuit were able to orient themselves 
in the harsh Arctic climate through careful observance of natural 
phenomena such as wind, snowdrifts, and water currents.26  In their 
article, Professors Aporta and Higgs describe both the positive and 
negative consequences from the use of GPS technology by the Inuit. 
Although hunting for walrus may have become less burdensome, over-
reliance on technology has led to a disengagement with the natural 
world along with hunting mishaps resulting from mechanical 
failures.27  
 Rapid changes in social behavior and cultural norms caused by the 
introduction of advanced technologies place a constant pressure for 
revisions in the legal balance between human rights and property 
                                                                                                                   
three seconds, click click, click.” Hal Boedeker, PBS’ Pioneers’ is a history lesson, CHI. 
TRIB., Aug. 8, 2005, at 7. 
24
 David A. Kelly, Global Positioning Systems: On Road or Trail, Navigating Made Simple, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2006, available at 
http://travel2.nytimes.com/2006/03/05/travel/05prac.html?pagewanted=1. 
25
 Claudio Aporta & Eric Higgs, Satellite Culture: Global Positioning Systems, Inuit 
Wayfinding, and the Need for a New Account of Technology, 46 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 
729 (2005). 
26
 Id. at 731. 
27
 Id. at 744-745. 
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rights.  A primary area of law that will be subjected to extensive 
efforts aimed at expanding the zone of protected privacy in the face of 
human tracking technologies will be provisions of the United States 
Constitution and analogous provisions of state constitutions.  This 
article begins with a discussion of case law regarding human tracking 
under the Fourth and Thirteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution and state constitutional provisions.  
I.   CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON THE USE OF HUMAN TRACKING 
TECHNOLOGY  
 The primary source for current American legal analysis of 
protected privacy interests stems from the field of constitutionally 
mandated criminal procedure based on judicial interpretations of the 
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.28  At present, the 
United States Supreme Court has not ruled on the applicability of the 
Fourth Amendment to most recent forms of human tracking 
technology.  Based on precedent over the past four decades regarding 
the scope of privacy protections under the Fourth Amendment, any 
expectation for broad judicially based limitations on human tracking 
technology would be illusory.  
 The tendency of certain justices and judges to apply judicial 
restraint with respect to constitutional criminal procedure should not 
be confused with indifference to the impact technology is having on 
privacy.  Five years ago, Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices 
Scalia and Thomas, expressed deep concerns regarding the decline in 
privacy in the modern technological world: 
Technology now permits millions of important and 
confidential conversations to occur through a vast system of 
electronic networks. These advances, however, raise 
significant privacy concerns. We are placed in the 
uncomfortable position of not knowing who might have 
access to our personal and business e-mails, our medical and 
 
 
 
 
28
 The Fourth Amendment provides that: “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, 
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” U.S. 
CONST. amend. IV. 
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financial records, or our cordless and cellular telephone 
conversations.29 
 Despite such pronouncements, it is unlikely that workable 
limitations on the use of human tracking devices will grow 
out of criminal appeals under the Fourth Amendment.  In 
addition, it is unlikely that in the present political climate 
Congress will increase federal restrictions on tracking 
technology based on contemporary deregulation ideology 
and the politics of fear.  It is far more probable that broader 
restrictions will come from state legislative initiatives and 
judicial interpretations of state constitutional provisions, 
statutes, and common law. 
A.   HUMAN TRACKING AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
 In 1928, fifty years following the invention of the telephone by 
Alexander Graham Bell, in Olmstead v. United States, the United 
States Supreme Court determined that the Fourth Amendment did not 
prohibit federal prohibition officials from eavesdropping on telephone 
conversations taking place in the defendants’ homes and offices by 
inserting small wires on eight telephone lines outside those premises.30  
The Olmstead majority reasoned that because the federal agents had 
placed the wiretaps on the outside they had not engaged in a search or 
seizure under the Fourth Amendment requiring the issuance of a 
warrant: “The intervening wires are not part of his house or office any 
more than are the highways along which they are stretched.”31  
Therefore, the majority affirmed the conspiracy convictions under the 
National Prohibition Act, that were based on the eavesdropping 
evidence.32 
 Today, the case of Olmstead v. United States is primarily 
remembered for the vigorous dissent authored by Justice Louis D. 
 
 
 
 
29
 Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 541 (2001) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). In that same 
year, Justice Scalia observed that “[i]t would be foolish to contend that the degree of privacy 
secured to citizens by the Fourth Amendment has been entirely unaffected by the advance of 
technology.” Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33-34 (2001). 
30
 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928). 
31 Id. at 465. 
32
 Id. at 469. 
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Brandeis.  Well before Olmstead, Brandeis was known for his co-
authorship of the seminal 1890 Harvard Law Review article “The 
Right to Privacy,” that advocated for enforceable common law rights 
against the invasion of personal privacy, especially in the face of the 
development of new technologies such as photography.33  
 In his Olmstead dissent, Brandeis presented a far-sighted critique 
regarding the government’s use of the new technology to invade the 
privacy of its citizens.  In contrast to the majority’s reliance on 
concepts of trespass law to limit the zone of privacy protected by the 
Fourth Amendment, Brandeis articulated a broader concept of 
constitutionally protected privacy that transcends both property 
interests and materialism: 
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure 
conditions favorable to the pursuit of happiness.  They 
recognized the significance of man’s spiritual nature, of his 
feelings and of his intellect.  They knew that only a part of 
the pain, pleasure and satisfactions of life are to be found in 
material things.  They sought to protect Americans in their 
beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations.  
They conferred, as against the Government, the right to be 
let alone-- the most comprehensive of rights and the right 
most valued by civilized men.  To protect that right, every 
unjustifiable intrusion by the Government upon the privacy 
of the individual, whatever the means employed, must be 
deemed a violation of the Fourth Amendment.34  
 Close to forty years later, the United States Supreme Court 
overruled the holding in Olmstead v. United States.  In Katz v. United 
States, the Court held that the FBI’s placement of a microphone on the 
roof of an enclosed public telephone booth to eavesdrop and tape 
record telephone calls made by an illegal gambling suspect, without a 
warrant, constituted a violation of the Fourth Amendment regardless 
of whether or not a physical intrusion had taken place.35  In reaching 
 
 
 
 
33
 Samuel  L. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 
(1890); See also David W. Leebron, The Right to Privacy’s Place in the Intellectual History of 
Tort Law, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 769 (1991); JEFFREY ROSEN, THE UNWANTED GAZE: THE 
DESTRUCTION OF PRIVACY IN AMERICA 5-7 (2000) [hereinafter UNWANTED GAZE].  
34
 Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
35
 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
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its decision in Katz, the Court’s majority rejected both a strict reliance 
on trespass law to define the scope of privacy protections under the 
Fourth Amendment, as well as Brandeis’ much broader concept that 
the Fourth Amendment gave Americans “the right to be let alone” by 
other people.36  Nevertheless, by mandating for the first time that the 
police obtain a court-ordered warrant before engaging in electronic 
surveillance, the Katz decision established a significant judicial check 
on government agents randomly engaging in such surveillance.37  
 In his concurrence in Katz, Justice Harlan formulated the now 
uniform test for determining whether the Fourth Amendment is 
applicable to a particular set of facts, including whether a particular 
use of a new invasive technology is unconstitutional: a) whether the 
individual possesses a subjective expectation of privacy, and b) 
whether the individual’s subjective expectation is “one that society is 
prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”38  Despite continued judicial 
reliance on Justice Harlan’s Katz formulation regarding the applicable 
test for what constitutes a protected expectation of privacy, as early as 
1971, Justice Harlan distanced himself from the formulation, noting 
that it can “lead to the substitution of words for analysis” and 
emphasized that the critical question “is whether under our system of 
government, as reflected in the Constitution, we should impose on our 
citizens the risks of the electronic listener or observer without at least 
the protection of a warrant requirement.”39 
B.  THE FOURTH AMENDMENT OUTSIDE AND INSIDE THE HOME 
 The Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test has led to a series 
of federal court decisions that have determined that, in most cases, the 
use of a tracking device to monitor the location of vehicles and 
containers are not subject to the Fourth Amendment.  The primary 
exception to this rule is when the device is utilized to determine what 
is taking place within a person’s home.    
 In 1983, in United States v. Knotts, the Supreme Court decided that 
the police did not have to obtain a warrant under the Fourth 
 
 
 
 
36
 Id. at 350 (stating that “the correct solution of Fourth Amendment problems is not 
necessarily promoted by incantation of the phrase “constitutionally protected area.”  Secondly, 
the Fourth Amendment cannot be translated into a general constitutional “right to privacy”). 
37
 Id. at 350-353. 
38
 Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
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Amendment before using a radio beeper to monitor the movement and 
location of a vehicle.40  The Court portrayed the use of such tracking 
technology as a mere extension of the police’s power to engage in 
visual surveillance of a criminal suspect.41 
 In Knotts, the police had placed a battery operated radio 
transmitter in a drum containing chloroform as part of a drug 
investigation.42  After the drug suspect purchased the drum, the police 
used the beeper’s signals to assist in conducting surveillance of the 
movement and location of the suspect’s car containing the drum of 
chloroform.43  The beeper transmissions, along with additional visual 
surveillance by the police, resulted in the issuance of a warrant and the 
disclosure of a clandestine drug laboratory located in a rural 
Wisconsin cabin.44  In reaching its decision, the Supreme Court 
applied a broad legal rule that renders the use of most human tracking 
devices attached to vehicles to be outside of Fourth Amendment 
protections: “A person traveling in an automobile on public 
thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his 
movements from one place to another.”45  
 Under Knotts, whether the vehicle is driven unseen on an empty 
highway, through a long dark tunnel, or an unpaved obscure 
mountainous road, is irrelevant.  The mere exposure of the vehicle to 
the sunlight or the exterior darkness grants the police, without a 
warrant, to monitor the movement of the vehicle utilizing a tracking 
device lawfully placed.   
 The principle applied in Knotts was based on earlier cases that had 
determined that Americans, in general, have few Fourth Amendment 
privacy rights while outside the home.  This exception to Fourth 
Amendment protections has been long recognized by the Supreme 
Court.  For example, in Hester v. United States, the Court determined 
that Fourth Amendment protections did not extend from a house into 
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an adjacent open field.46  Sixty years later, the open fields exception to 
the Fourth Amendment was reaffirmed in Oliver v. United States.47   
 Intentional or inadvertent exposure can also defeat a claimed 
expectation of privacy.  Therefore, the Fourth Amendment has been 
found inapplicable to aerial police observation of an area from public 
air space.48  Similarly, the Court has held that the Fourth Amendment 
was not violated when law enforcement stood in an open field and 
observed the inside of a barn that was 60 yards from a home.49 
 It is reasonable to assume that this limited conception of privacy 
under the Fourth Amendment would be equally applicable to the use 
of location devices that are legally attached or carried by an individual 
on public streets, roads, and trails.  An expansive application of this 
principle to new location technology in an unregulated market 
economy would permit anyone to electronically track anyone else in 
public. 
 One year after Knotts, the Supreme Court in United States v. Karo 
was called upon to determine whether the police violated the Fourth 
Amendment when they attached a beeper to a can of chemicals during 
another drug investigation to determine the can’s location within a 
private residence not open to visual surveillance.50  Like Knotts, the 
police in Karo had used beeper transmissions and visual surveillance 
to follow the movement of the can to various locations.51  However, 
unlike Knotts, the police continued to utilize the beeper to determine 
whether the can was located in the private house.52  In concluding that 
the Fourth Amendment had been violated, the Karo majority applied a 
core Fourth Amendment principle that a search and seizure inside a 
home without a warrant is presumptively unreasonable absent an 
exigent circumstance.53  Based on the fact that the beeper allowed the 
police to learn that the can was located in the house and allowed for 
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 Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924). 
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 Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984). 
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 California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986).  
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 United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294 (1987). 
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 United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 707 (1984). 
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them to monitor its internal movement, the Court concluded that the 
use of the tracking device constituted an unlawful search under the 
Fourth Amendment.54 
 The broad scope of judicially recognized Fourth Amendment 
protections against technological surveillance within the home was 
exemplified in the 2001 decision in Kyllo v. United States.55  At the 
same time, the Kyllo decision suggests that the proliferation of 
invasive technological tools in general public use may eviscerate any 
reasonable expectation to privacy within one’s home.  
 In Kyllo, the police suspected that marijuana was being grown 
inside a home utilizing high-density halide lamps.56  In order to 
determine whether such lamps were being utilized, the police while 
seated in their car in the street, scanned the home utilizing a thermal 
imager to detect infrared radiation that is invisible to the naked eye.57  
The scanning device reported that portions of the house were hotter 
than other sections of the house and neighboring homes.58  In 
concluding that the police’s use of the thermal-imaging device without 
a warrant violated the Fourth Amendment because it was capable of 
detecting lawful behavior in the house, the Kyllo majority stated: 
Where, as here, the Government uses a device that is not in 
general public use, to explore details of the home that would 
previously have been unknowable without physical 
intrusion, the surveillance is a “search” and is presumptively 
unreasonable without a warrant.59 
 At present, the Supreme Court has not interpreted the Fourth 
Amendment with regard to more advanced forms of tracking 
technology such as GPS, RFID, or real time cell site monitoring.  
Based on Supreme Court precedent since Katz, it is unlikely that the 
Court will rule that the Fourth Amendment requires a warrant prior to 
the police utilizing such devices to electronically track movement in 
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public.  However, a strong argument can be made that based on the 
scope of private information obtainable through GPS and cellular 
tracking technology, the Fourth Amendment probable cause and 
warrant requirements should be found applicable.60  In 2005, a Federal 
District Court in New York, relying on the Knotts decision, ruled that 
the Fourth Amendment was not violated when the police attached GPS 
devices to the defendant’s vehicles because the defendant had no 
expectation of privacy while driving on public roadways.61  In 
contrast, a federal judge in Maryland has questioned, without deciding, 
whether the extraordinary amount of detailed personal information 
obtainable through the use of a GPS device would render it subject to 
Fourth Amendment constraints.62  
 The Kyllo and Karo decisions strongly suggest that the use of 
GPS, RFID, and real time cell site technology by the police to monitor 
the location of an individual or object within a home will be subject to 
the requirements of the Fourth Amendment.  Based on the portability 
of cell phones, lawful public location surveillance by the police under 
Knotts can easily be transformed into unlawful surveillance under 
Karo if the cell phone is being carried into a home or other private 
space.  Last year, three United States District Court Magistrates issued 
decisions raising such Fourth Amendment concerns with respect to 
warrantless real time cell site monitoring.63  
 Finally, it should not be overlooked that the Kyllo decision 
contains an ominous caveat regarding Fourth Amendment protections 
against electronic surveillance within a home: it is limited to devices 
that are not “in general public use.”64  This expressed limitation in the 
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Kyllo holding raises the possibility that the proliferation of cell phones 
and inexpensive GPS devices could lead the Supreme Court to 
conclude that electronic monitoring within a home using such devices 
is not subject to the Fourth Amendment.  
C.  THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT AND HUMAN TRACKING 
 Professors Jerome Dobson and Peter F. Fisher have applied the 
term “geoslavery” to describe how new location tracking devices can 
result in coercive control over human movement and direction.65  The 
metaphorical application of the term “slavery” to electronic human 
tracking has both historical precedence and legal relevance.66  From 
well before the Civil War through the 1930s, phrases such as “wage 
slavery” and “industrial slavery” were frequently applied to describe 
the oppressed conditions and status of workers.67  The brutal reality of 
chattel slavery was obviously and substantially more oppressive than 
19th Century working conditions or contemporary use of electronic 
monitoring.  Nevertheless, in considering possible legal restraints 
applicable to human tracking it is relevant to consider the value such 
devices would have had for slaveholders in the 19th Century, the 
impact such technology would have had on American history, and 
whether such devices constitute a vestige of slavery. 
 Historians John Hope Franklin and Loren Schweninger have 
detailed and documented the amount of time and resources Southern 
slaveholders had to expend in searching for and capturing runaway 
slaves.68  Their study highlights that essential aspects of American 
slavery included restrictions on the freedom of movement of enslaved 
African-Americans and severe corporal punishment imposed by 
slaveholders and overseers when slaves were caught escaping or 
captured following escape.  
 Many in bondage attempted and succeeded in escaping for 
different motives including legal emancipation, reunions with family 
members, and escape from particularly brutal owners.  The method 
and direction of escape differed widely, causing slave owners to rely 
 
 
 
 
65
 Jerome E. Dobson & Peter F. Fisher, Geoslavery, IEEE TECH. AND SOC’Y MAG., Spring 
2003, at 47. 
66
 See FONER, supra note 1, at 29-31. 
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on speculation and surmise in tracking down their escaped human 
property.69  As a means of locating and capturing those who escaped, 
slaveholders hired lawyers, petitioned state legislatures, purchased 
newspaper advertisements, and utilized slave catchers.  These means 
of human tracking were expensive and inefficient. 
  American concerns regarding the location and capture of those 
who escaped from bondage can be found in the United States 
Constitution.  Slaveholder interest in maintaining physical and legal 
control over their human chattel was so great that the Constitution was 
drafted to contain the Fugitive Slave Clause aimed at guaranteeing the 
return of a runaway who succeeded in an interstate escape.70  The 
Fugitive Slave Clause, originally proposed by a South Carolina 
delegate to the Constitutional Convention, was aimed at insuring that 
slaveholders had a constitutionally based means of obtaining the return 
of a runaway slave who had escaped to a free state without the 
drafters’ using the word slavery.71  In 1793, the Second Congress 
enacted legislation granting slaveholders and their agents a specific 
legal procedure permitting them to seize an individual and take him or 
her before a magistrate to obtain a certificate requiring a return to 
bondage in a slave state.72 
 As part of the Compromise of 1850, Congress enacted the Fugitive 
Slave Act aimed at easing the ability of Southern slaveholders to 
recapture fugitive slaves through Federal judicial means.  However, 
rather than calming the rising national dispute over slavery, the 
provisions of the Fugitive Slave Act precipitated an increase in 
aggressive Abolitionist activity including active resistance to the 
capture of freed slaves.73  
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 Id. at 97-123. 
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 The United States Constitution states, “No Person held to Service or Labour in one State, 
under the Laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in Consequence of any Law or 
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71
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CONSTITUTION 89, 91 (1996). 
72
 Thomas Sims’s Case, 61 Mass. (1 Cush.) 285, 297-298, 301-302 (1851). 
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 RICHARD H. SEWELL, BALLOTS FOR FREEDOM: ANTISLAVERY POLITICS IN THE UNITED STATES 
1837-1860 236-239 (1976); HENRY MAYER, ALL ON FIRE: WILLIAM LLOYD GARRISON AND THE 
ABOLITION OF SLAVERY 406-442 (1998); MILTON C. SERNETT, NORTH STAR COUNTRY: 
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 The 1851 Thomas Sims’s Case is an example of the type of 
antebellum litigation that resulted when slave owners sought the return 
of a runaway.74  On April 3, 1851, under the powers of the Fugitive 
Slave Act of 1850, Commissioner George T. Curtis of the United 
States Circuit Court issued a warrant to the Massachusetts federal 
marshal requiring the capture of Sims, an African-American “fugitive 
from labor” to answer a complaint filed on behalf of a Georgia slave 
owner.75  Following Sims’s capture and imprisonment pursuant to the 
warrant, a habeas corpus petition was filed in Massachusetts’s state 
court seeking to free Sims and challenging the Fugitive Slave Law. 
The petition was heard before Massachusetts’ Chief Judge Lemuel 
Shaw, the father-in-law of Herman Melville.  To avoid the recurrence 
of Abolitionists’ physical efforts to rescue Sims, heavy chains were 
placed around the courthouse.76  Although personally opposed to 
slavery, Chief Judge Shaw denied the writ concluding that the Fugitive 
Slave Act was constitutional based on the history of the Fugitive Slave 
Clause and precedent upholding the earlier 1793 federal fugitive slave 
law.77  Following Chief Judge Shaw’s application of judicial restraint, 
Sims was returned to bondage in Georgia and subjected to a severe 
public beating.78 
 The use of GPS, RFID, and biometric technology by slave owners 
would have perpetuated the enslavement of African-Americans, 
substantially decreased the cost of tracking down runaways, and 
altered American history.  The use of real time location technology 
would have vastly improved the monitoring of the daily productivity 
of slave labor, thereby increasing efficiency along with the economic 
value and power of America’s peculiar institution.  Such technology 
would have also made slave resistance and escape far more difficult.  
Through GPS or RFID implants, slaveholders would have been able to 
easily locate and identify individuals who succeeded in escaping.  
Working together, slaveholders would have been able to establish geo-
fences and a communications network that would have substantially 
aided in slaveholder domination over the personal lives of those held 
in bondage. By undermining the ability of individuals such as 
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Frederick Douglass from escaping, these technological tools may have 
decreased the awareness in the North of the horrors of American 
slavery prior to the Civil War.79   
 In 1865, Congress adopted the Thirteenth Amendment, 
subsequently ratified by the States, banning slavery and involuntary 
servitude.  Unlike other constitutional amendments, the Thirteenth 
Amendment uniquely restricts both private conduct as well as 
governmental action.80  The Thirteenth Amendment states: 
1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a 
punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly 
convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place 
subject to their jurisdiction. 
 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by 
appropriate legislation.81 
 The Thirteenth Amendment was never intended to be limited to 
ending the enslavement of African-Americans.  In 1911, the United 
States Supreme Court highlighted the amendment’s broad breadth 
when it described the amendment as “a charter of universal civil 
freedom for all persons, of whatever race, color or estate, under the 
flag” that was intended to abolish both slavery as well as all vestiges, 
badges, and incidents of slavery.82  In addition to outlawing slavery, 
the Thirteenth Amendment also prohibits involuntary servitude.  
 The amendment granted Congress the power to enact legislation 
targeted at eliminating those badges and incidents of slavery including 
the “privilege to go and come” as one pleases.83  Congressional 
authority under the amendment includes the power “to determine what 
are the badges and the incidents of slavery, and the authority to 
translate that determination into effective legislation.”84  However, it 
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was not intended to be the basis for challenging various established 
societal power relationships such as that of parent-child.85 
 Based on the history and interpretation of the Thirteenth 
Amendment, Alexander Tsesis has argued that the amendment 
provides the constitutional predicate for the enactment of broad federal 
laws banning public and private limitations on universal liberties.86  
 Whether a majority of the United States Supreme Court would 
concur with Tsesis’ thesis of such broad congressional power under 
the Thirteenth Amendment remains in doubt.  Various Supreme Court 
decisions in the past fifteen years have demarcated newly established 
limitations on congressional legislative power under the Commerce 
Clause, the Eleventh Amendment, and the remedial provision of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.87  
 Nevertheless, a reasonably strong argument can be made that 
Congress does have the constitutional power under the remedial 
provision of the Thirteenth Amendment to ban the use of tracking 
devices to dominate and control the location of others.  Imposing 
restrictions, control, and monitoring over another’s location constitutes 
a vestige and incident of slavery.  
 In addition, mandatory tracking, identification implants, or 
attachments on another human being would be subject to court 
challenge under the Thirteenth Amendment.  Such devices are the 
technological equivalent, in many respects, to various slaveholder 
tools, including branding, utilized to keep African-Americans from 
escaping bondage or as punishment for such escapes.  Therefore, the 
use of such devices to establish geo-fences and even impose corporal 
punishment would constitute a vestige of slavery.  In addition, the 
imposition of physical injury or threat of physical injury emanating 
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from a tracking device would be subject to challenge as a form of 
involuntary servitude especially if the electronic punishment is aimed 
at forcing an individual to continue working.88  
D.  STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON THE USE OF TRACKING 
DEVICES 
 The application of the reasonable expectation of privacy test to 
new technological intrusions is not without its critics.  As Jeffrey 
Rosen has pointed out, “[A]s advances in the technology of 
monitoring and searching have made ever more intrusive surveillance 
possible, expectations of privacy have naturally diminished, with a 
corresponding reduction in constitutional protections.”89  The Oregon 
Supreme Court in State v. Campbell termed the reasonable expectation 
test as “a formula for expressing a conclusion rather than a starting 
point for analysis, masking the various substantive considerations that 
are the real bases on which Fourth Amendment searches are 
defined.”90  
 Various state courts have determined, under their respective state 
constitutions, that the police are required to obtain a warrant prior to 
utilizing an electronic device.  In reaching such legal conclusions, the 
courts have recognized that electronic tracking devices are not mere 
technological enhancements to law enforcement vision but rather a 
substantial intrusion into an individual’s privacy and autonomy.  
 In State v. Campbell, the Oregon Constitution was interpreted to 
prohibit the police’s warrantless use of a radio transmitter to locate a 
private vehicle.91  In that case, the police used a radio transmitter 
attached to a burglary suspect’s car to track his movements after the 
police were unable to maintain constant visual surveillance.92  In 
determining that a warrant is required prior to the police utilizing a 
tracking device, the Oregon Supreme Court rejected the Supreme 
Court’s rationale in Knotts and determined that the transmitter was a 
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location finder rather than a mere extension of police visual tracking.93  
In substitution of the reasonable expectation of privacy test, the 
Oregon Supreme Court defined a privacy interest as “an interest in 
freedom from particular forms of scrutiny” and concluded that the use 
of a radio transmitter to locate a person or object constituted a 
significant limitation on the freedom from scrutiny.94 
 In reaching its conclusion, the Oregon Court recognized the 
perniciousness of technological tracking devices by creating a daily 
fear of being watched:  
The limitation is made more substantial by the fact that the 
radio transmitter is much more difficult to detect than 
would-be observers who must rely upon the sense of sight. 
Without an ongoing, meticulous examination of one’s 
possessions, one can never be sure that one’s location is not 
being monitored by means of a radio transmitter. Thus, 
individuals must more readily assume that they are the 
objects of government scrutiny.95   
 In 2003, the Washington Supreme Court ruled that under 
Washington’s more protective constitutional provision regarding 
searches and seizures, the police were required to obtain a warrant 
based on probable cause prior to attaching a GPS device to a citizen’s 
vehicle.96  In accordance with the Oregon Supreme Court’s analysis, 
Washington’s highest court concluded that a GPS device replaces 
rather than augments police visual surveillance.  In reaching its 
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decision, Washington’s highest court recognized the enormous 
intrusive power of GPS devices to provide a detailed picture of an 
individual’s daily life, stating that:  
[U]se of GPS tracking devices is a particularly intrusive 
method of surveillance, making it possible to acquire an 
enormous amount of personal information about the citizen 
under circumstances where the individual is unaware that 
every single vehicle trip taken and the duration of every 
single stop may be recorded by the government.97  
 Two New York State trial courts have rendered conflicting 
decisions regarding whether the New York State Constitution requires 
the police to obtain a warrant prior to attaching a GPS device to a 
vehicle.  In People v. Lacey, one county judge, without articulating a 
developed legal analysis, concluded in 2004 that a warrant was 
required.98  Last year, another county judge reached the opposite 
conclusion based on the Knotts analysis that an individual does not 
have a legitimate expectation of privacy while driving on public 
roads.99 
 In addition to state constitutional limitations regarding 
governmental search and seizure, certain states have explicit 
constitutional privacy provisions that may form the basis for future 
challenges to governmental and private use of tracking devices.  For 
example, California Constitution, Art. 1, § 1 contains an explicit 
reference to a right of privacy applicable to both private as well as 
state conduct.100  In 1970, Illinois, in direct response to the 
development of new intrusive technologies, amended its constitution 
to include an express provision protecting its citizens against invasions 
 
 
 
 
97
 Jackson, 76 P.3d at 224; see also State v. Kelly, 708 P.2d 820 (Haw. 1985) (in which the 
Hawaii Supreme Court ruled that the police’s warrantless installation of a beeper in a 
photograph album was both an unreasonable search and seizure under the Hawaiian 
Constitution).  
98
 People v. Lacey, Indictment No. 2463N/02, 2004 WL 1040676 (Nassau, N.Y. County Ct. 
May 6, 2004). 
99
 People v. Gant,  9 Misc. 3d 611 (Westchester, N.Y. County Ct. 2005). 
100 The California Constitution states, “All people are by nature free and independent and have 
inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, 
possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness, and 
privacy.” CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 1.  
2006] HERBERT 433 
 
 
of privacy, including the use of electronic surveillance.101  Other states 
such as Hawaii, Alaska, and Florida have similar specific state 
constitutional provisions protecting the right to privacy.102   
 Nevertheless, it remains unclear how these various state 
constitutional privacy provisions will be applied to new electronic 
tracking devices.  Unlike Oregon’s highest court, the California 
Supreme Court in Hill v. NCAA, ruled that in order to be able to allege 
a violation of California’s constitutional right to privacy, a plaintiff 
must establish a violation of a reasonable expectation of privacy.103  
Under the standards set forth in Hill v. NCAA, a reasonable 
expectation of privacy under the California constitution will be 
determined by state judges based on a variety of objective 
considerations, borrowed from the common law, including advanced 
warning or consent, community customs, norms, and practices and the 
physical setting of the particular activity.104  Constitutional privacy 
challenges in California to a fingerprint requirement for a driver’s 
license and biometric finger-imaging requirement for public assistance 
have been unsuccessful.105  It remains to be seen whether the state 
 
 
 
 
101 The Illinois Constitution provides, “The people shall have the right to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers and other possessions against unreasonable searches, seizures, 
invasions of privacy or interceptions of communications by eavesdropping devices or other 
means. No warrant shall issue without probable cause, supported by affidavit particularly 
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.” ILL. CONST. art. 1, 
§ 6. 
102 The Hawaiian Constitution states, “The right of the people to privacy is recognized and 
shall not be infringed without the showing of a compelling state interest. The legislature shall 
take affirmative steps to implement this right.” HAW. CONST. art. 1, § 6.  Similarly, the 
Alaskan Constitution states,  "The right of the people to privacy is recognized and shall not be 
infringed. The legislature shall implement this section." ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 22.  
Likewise, the Florida Constitution states, “Every natural person has the right to be let alone 
and free from governmental intrusion into the person's private life except as otherwise 
provided herein. This section shall not be construed to limit the public's right of access to 
public records and meetings as provided by law.” FLA. CONST. art. 1 § 23. 
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 Hill v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 865 P.2d 633, 655 (Cal. 1994); see also State v. 
Glass, 583 P.2d 872, 875 (Alaska 1978) (in which the Alaska Supreme Court explicitly 
adopted Justice Harlan’s formulation in Katz to the Alaska’s state constitutional right to 
privacy, making the law in Alaska similar to that of California in requiring that there be a 
reasonable expectation of privacy before there can be a violation of the right to privacy).  
104
 Hill, 865 P.2d at 655. 
105
 Perkey v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 228 Cal. Rptr. 169 (1986) (finding that a 
mandatory fingerprint requirement did not violate the U.S. Constitution, holding that the 
requirement violated California statutory provisions, and declining to determine whether the 
requirement violated the California Constitution); Sheyko v. Saenz, 5 Cal. Rptr. 3d 350 (Ct. 
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constitutional right to privacy in California will be interpreted to place 
limitations on the use of electronic surveillance to track public 
activities.  The extraordinary speed of technological innovation in the 
field of human tracking has created constantly evolving legal, public 
policy, and ethical challenges.  The recent introduction of human 
tracking implants into medicine, patient care, employment, and 
recreation raises substantial questions regarding whether current law 
provides an appropriate and satisfactory framework to protect 
individual privacy and liberty. 
II. THE LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF HUMAN TRACKING IMPLANT 
TECHNOLOGY  
 The development, marketing, and use of human subdermal RFID 
and GPS implants raise challenging and new legal and ethical issues.  
As early as 1985, California veterinarian Hannis L. Stoddard was 
working on the development of an implantable identification chip for 
use with animals.106  Implanted RFID tracking devices are used 
frequently in the identification of animals.  The British company 
Trovan, Ltd. markets various forms of implantable transponders and 
readers throughout the world for animal and human identification.107  
GPS and RFID implants are being marketed for the monitoring, 
control, identification, and return of domestic animals.  Through GPS 
technology, a pet owner can create a virtual fence for the pet and 
receive email messages regarding its location.108 
                                                                                                                   
App. 2003).  In addition, constitutional challenges on religious grounds to biometric imaging 
have been rejected by state appellate courts in California and New York. Id.; Medvedev v. 
Wing, 671 N.Y.S.2d 806 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998).  
106
 Hannis L. Stoddard, III, How AVID started, http://www.avidid.com/stoddard.html (last 
visited May 17, 2006). 
107
 Trovan, Electronic Identification Systems, http://www.trovan.com/company.htm (last 
visited May 17, 2006).  One example of the ubiquitous use of Trovan products was observed 
fortuitously during a 2005 family visit to Namibia where leopards have been implanted with 
Trovan RFID devices as part of a concerted effort to preserve their endangered population.  
During the same trip, I observed elephants with GPS devices around their necks as part of a 
study of their migration patterns in southern Africa.  
108 Anne Eisenberg, For the Fretting Pet Owner, a Wireless Distress Signal, N.Y. TIMES, July 
15, 2004, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/07/15/technology/circuits/15next.html?ex=1247630400&en=6
8121d87ca4dd70d&ei=5090&partner=rssuserland;  Kathleen Megan, GPS designed to find 
lost pets, notify owners, MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 12, 2006, available at 
http://www.miami.com/mld/miamiherald/living/home/pets/13843615.htm.  The Schering-
Plough Animal Health Corporation markets the HomeAgain pet recovery service that 
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 Both Congress and state legislatures have enacted laws embracing 
the use of RFID implants for domestic and farm animals.  On 
November 10, 2005, President George W. Bush signed into the law the 
Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and 
Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2006.109  This Act mandates 
and funds the establishment of a national RFID animal microchip 
system, as well as requires the United States Department of 
Agriculture to promulgate regulations regarding the system.110  
 Various states including Minnesota, Oregon, New York, and 
Colorado have codified procedures for implanting microchips in 
dangerous or potentially dangerous dogs.111  
 The first known experiment regarding the use of a human tracking 
implant took place at the University of Reading in England in 1998.112  
Professor of Cybernetics, Kevin Warwick, had an RFID tracking 
device implant placed in his arm that enabled him to monitor his 
movements on campus for one week.113  An expressed purpose for the 
experiment was to demonstrate the inherent dangers to personal 
privacy connected with implant technology.114   
 Dr. John D. Halamka, the Chief Information Officer for the 
Harvard Medical Center, has conducted a more recent and longer 
experiment in the use of a voluntary human RFID implant containing a 
16-digit medical identifier.115  With the use of a handheld RFID 
transponder, Dr. Halamka’s implanted identifier can be obtained and 
used to discover his identity and his doctor through an internet site 
                                                                                                                   
utilizes RFID implants.  See HomeAgain Pet Recovery Service, HomeAgain Information 
Center, http://www.homeagainpets.com/. 
109
 Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies 
Appropriations Act, 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-97, 119 Stat. 2120 (2005). 
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 Id. 
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 MINN. STAT. § 347.515 (2006); OR. REV. STAT. § 609.168 (2006); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-
9-204.5(3)(e.5) (2006); N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTS. LAW § 121(2) (Consol. 2006). 
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 Technology gets under the skin, BBC NEWS, Apr. 24, 1998, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/sci/tech/158007.stm. 
113
 Id. 
114
 Id.; See also The University of Reading, Professor Kevin Warwick, 
http://www.kevinwarwick.org (last visited May 17, 2006). 
115
 John Halamka, Straight from the Shoulder, 353 NEW ENG. J. MED. 331, 331-332 (2005). 
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maintained by the manufacturer.116  Significantly, the implant does not 
include any medical history or any known disabilities and is not 
equipped to monitor Dr. Halamka’s location.  His willingness to 
participate in the experiment was an outgrowth of Dr. Halamka’s 
experiences as an emergency room resident when he was unable to 
determine the identification of patients.117  In his article, Dr. Halamka 
acknowledges the possibility that the implant can lead to invasion of 
privacy due to the non-use of encryption technology, the unauthorized 
use of transponders and hacking.118  In response to claims by others 
that human implant chips are Orwellian in nature, Dr. Halamka 
concedes: “I have not investigated these or other moral, religious, or 
political implications of having an implanted identifier.”119 
 The American company, Applied Digital Solutions, Inc., is 
aggressively marketing its RFID VeriChip human implant to 
hospitals and doctors in the United States for the same emergency 
room purposes articulated by Dr. Halamka.  Last year, a New Jersey 
hospital was the first to commence the regular scanning of emergency 
room patients for a medical identification number contained in the 
microchip.120  Approximately 80 hospitals and medical centers in the 
United States have since agreed to utilize the RFID implant system.121  
This hospital  based marketing has succeeded in persuading patients to 
consent to receiving implants.122  Other hospitals around the country 
have received RFID scanners and may begin utilizing the technology 
in their emergency rooms.123  
 In general, the marketing and publicity surrounding these implant 
products focus on the purported convenience, security, and the ability 
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to alleviate fear.  The impact on personal privacy, the products’ 
reliability, and the interception of data by third parties has not received 
similar coverage.  However, the recent scholarly paper describing the 
potential vulnerability of RFID technology to cyber viruses and worms 
may constitute a powerful antidote to the impact of the hyper-
marketing of implants through hospitals and doctors.124  
 The aggressive promotion of human implant products in the 
United States and abroad utilize standard advertising techniques.  In 
addition to utilizing hospitals and medical professionals as promoters, 
the product is being marketed for both security and recreational 
purposes.  RFID implants are being publicized as a mere technological 
extension to the body-piercing trend that permits bodily integration 
with computers.  A technology entrepreneur who volunteered for 
implants in both hands admitted to the New York Times “the 
symbolism of the tag is much more of a big deal as a social 
marker.”125 A website has been established in an effort to expand this 
social phenomenon of voluntary technological branding.126  RFID 
implants are also being marketed for voluntary use by tavern patrons 
to avoid having to pay with cash or credit cards and for computer users 
who cannot remember their passwords.127  Others, with an economic 
interest in the technology, have publicly volunteered to receive 
implants as part of a marketing strategy.128                 
 At least one United States employer, an Ohio surveillance 
company, recently announced that two of its employees have received 
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 Anna Bahney, High Tech, Under the Skin, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2006, at G1 (quoting Amal 
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 Chetna Purohit, Technology Gets Under Clubbers’ Skin, CNN, June 9, 2004,  
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RFID implants for identification purposes.129  However, it remains 
unclear whether acceptance of the implants was mandated by the 
employer or was volitional.130  In Mexico, the Verichip has been 
implanted in government officials for access to a secure government 
building and non-government volunteers have received implants in 
response to their fear of being kidnapped.131  In 2005, Qustar Ltd. 
announced a plan  to commence  marketing to parents two models of 
implantable GPS devices aimed at responding to parental fears of child 
abductions.132 
 The development, marketing, and use of human RFID and GPS 
implants raise important legal and ethical issues.133  Transferring the 
application of implant technology from animal chattel to humans, for 
the same purposes of identification and location control, creates the 
specter of geoslavery that may be violative of the Thirteenth 
Amendment.  At present, however, the legal ramifications regarding 
human implants, including the legality of government or privately 
mandated implants, remains undeveloped.  
 It is improbable that a government program requiring human 
implants for non-criminals would be found to be lawful.  Such a 
mandate would run afoul of Supreme Court due process jurisprudence 
and precedent establishing a constitutionally protected right to privacy 
against governmental intrusions into intimate personal affairs.134 
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Mandated government intrusions into the human body implicate 
substantial liberty interests protected under the Due Process Clause of 
the 14th Amendment.135 
 In Rochin v. California, the Court held that the police violated the 
due process rights of a drug suspect when they compelled an 
involuntary pumping of his stomach in order to seize two capsules 
containing drugs that he had swallowed.136  Justice Felix Frankfurter, 
writing for the majority, emphasized the significance of coerced 
governmental intrusions into the body: 
This is conduct that shocks the conscience.  Illegally 
breaking into the privacy of the petitioner, the struggle to 
open his mouth and remove what was there, the forcible 
extraction of his stomach’s contents--this course of 
proceeding by agents of government to obtain evidence is 
bound to offend even hardened sensibilities. They are 
methods too close to the rack and the screw to permit of 
constitutional differentiation.137  
 Under the Fourth Amendment, the Court treats all physical 
intrusions by governmental officials into a human body as a search 
and seizure because it violates an expectation of privacy recognized by 
our society.  This reasonable expectation of privacy against unwanted 
bodily intrusions is balanced against the articulated legitimate 
governmental interest to determine whether the search was 
unreasonable.138  The application of this balancing test is very 
different when “special needs, beyond the normal need for law 
enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement 
impracticable.”139  When the “special needs” concerns are not related 
                                                                                                                   
research laboratory that conducted unconsented testing for traits of sickle cell anemia, 
syphilis, and pregnancy). 
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to crime detection, courts will make a context-specific inquiry 
balancing the competing private and public interests.140  
 For example, mandatory drug and alcohol testing programs in 
employment and public schools have been upheld under the Fourth 
Amendment based on special safety needs that outweighed the 
reasonable expectation of privacy against such bodily intrusions.141  In 
contrast, a state hospital policy, established with the aid of the police, 
under which non-consenting pregnant patients were subjected to urine 
drug tests and were subject to criminal prosecution if they tested 
positive for cocaine, was struck down as a violation of the Fourth 
Amendment.142  In 1997, the Supreme Court invalidated on Fourth 
Amendment grounds a state law mandating that state political 
candidates certify that he or she has taken a drug test and that the 
result was negative.143  In striking down the statute, the Supreme Court 
found that the State lacked any special need based on the lack of 
evidence demonstrating a drug problem among elected state officials 
or that they performed safety sensitive job duties.144 
 Based on the sustained nature of an implant’s intrusion into the 
body, it is improbable that the courts, in most situations, would find 
that a special government interest outweighs the liberty and privacy 
interests protected under the United States Constitution.  Nevertheless, 
police use of a scanner to obtain the identity of a lawfully stopped 
individual with an implant may not constitute a violation of the Fourth 
Amendment.  In Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court, the Supreme 
Court held that a Nevada law requiring a person, upon being stopped 
by the police, to identify himself to the police did not violate the 
Fourth Amendment.145  In upholding the law, the Court reasoned that 
such a request for identification is reasonable in the context of a police 
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stop.146  It remains to be seen whether police scanning of an 
individual’s RFID implant for identification information will be 
deemed by the courts to constitute an extension of the holding in 
Hiibel or be construed as a bodily intrusion subject to the Fourth 
Amendment.  
 Without new legislation banning the practice, the common law tort 
of assault and battery, as well as the Thirteenth Amendment, would 
form the bases for challenging privately mandated human tracking 
implants.  In Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital, the New 
York Court of Appeals recognized that “[e]very human being of adult 
years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with 
his own body.”147  When someone is subjected to unwanted non-
emergency surgery, they have the right to sue for damages for 
assault.148 
 Mandated human RFID implants that contain confidential medical 
information may also violate the confidentiality provisions of the 
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) and the 
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).149  A mandate that medical 
information protected under HIPAA be made accessible through an 
RFID implant to anyone with an appropriate reader would violate 
HIPAA’s confidential provisions.150  To the extent that an employer 
mandates implants for employees containing confidential medical 
information would render the employer vulnerable to liability based on 
the ADA’s confidentiality requirements with respect to medical 
records.151  
 For at least a decade, electronic wrist and ankle bracelets have 
been required as a condition of house arrest, probation, and parole to 
enable officials to keep track of the offenders in and outside the home.  
Individuals under house arrest, along with probationers and parolees, 
are granted “conditional liberty” subject to special and unique 
 
 
 
 
146
 Id. at 188. 
147
 Schloendorff v. Society of New York, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914). 
148
 Id. 
149
 See 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-2; 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d) (2006). 
150
 Id. 
151
 See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.14(b)(1), (d)(1) (2006). 
442 I/S: A JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY [Vol. 2:2 
 
 
restrictions including a significantly reduced expectation of privacy.152  
Due to the limitations connected with the radial scope of RFID 
technology, electronic bracelets utilizing GPS technology are 
increasingly being utilized throughout the country.  
  As a practical matter, most people convicted of a crime would 
prefer electronic location monitoring to incarceration.  This alternative 
to prison serves various societal interests because it is less expensive 
and grants the offender a greater opportunity to engage in 
rehabilitative activities.  
 The criminal population most vulnerable to a potential program of 
mandated human tracking implants is those convicted of sex crimes.  
In Ohio, a county official and sheriff have stated their support for the 
use of implants to monitor ex-convicts.153  Due to heightened fear 
regarding recidivism by sex offenders, various states have enacted or 
are considering laws mandating lifetime electronic location monitoring 
for  sex offenders.154  In Wisconsin, the cost for implementing a 24 
hour GPS tracking system for sex offenders has been estimated at 
$477 million over 20 years.155  It  may be only a matter of time before 
elected officials begin calling for the use of tracking implants on many 
different types of criminal convicts.156  
 Whether the Court will deem the use of tracking implants for 
inmates and other convicts to be violative of due process remains to be 
seen.  Even when prison officials intrude on substantial liberty 
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interests of prisoners, the regulation will be upheld as long as it is 
“reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.”157  
 Although electronic bracelets have been utilized successfully, the 
fact that they are less intrusive than electronic implants does not 
preclude the possibility that human electronic implants will be found 
to be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment when applied to 
criminal offenders.  In a series of Fourth Amendment decisions, the 
Supreme Court has been dismissive of arguments premised on the 
mere existence of less intrusive means.158  Under the Fourth 
Amendment special needs and general balancing tests, federal courts 
have sustained state laws mandating the extraction of DNA samples 
from the bodies of various classes of convicted offenders to be utilized 
in a computerized DNA database.159  In any challenge to possible 
future use of human implants on criminal offenders, strong national 
evidence will have to be presented to a court demonstrating the 
success of the less intrusive electronic bracelets along with evidence 
establishing that implanted GPS technology is not more accurate or 
reliable than data stemming from a bracelet. 
 As a practical matter, the best means of establishing informed 
public policy with respect to implant technology is through a 
deliberative legislative process on the national, state, and local levels 
along with informed and reasoned public debate.  The article next 
discusses the congressional response to the development and use of 
other forms of human tracking technology over the past twenty years. 
The lack of substantial legislative movement in the field of tracking 
technology renders it unlikely that there will be a federal legislative 
response to human implants in the near future. 
III.   FEDERAL LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES TO HUMAN TRACKING AND 
CELLULAR TECHNOLOGY 
 In response to the development of electronic technology, Congress 
has enacted legislation placing certain restrictions on the use of 
 
 
 
 
157
 Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 223-224 (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 
(1987)). 
158 See Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 647 (1983); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 
U.S. 543, 556-557 n. 12 (1976). 
159
 See Nicholas v. Goord, 430 F.3d 652, 671 (2d Cir. 2005); United States v. Kincade, 379 
F.3d 813 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc), cert. denied,  544 U.S. 924 (2005); Green v. Berge, 354 
F.3d 675, 679 (7th Cir. 2004). 
444 I/S: A JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY [Vol. 2:2 
 
 
tracking technologies by federal law enforcement.  The protection of 
privacy against the use of various forms of new technologies, 
however, has not been a major congressional priority.   
 In 1986, Congress passed the Electronic Communications Privacy 
Act of 1986 (“ECPA”).  The ECPA includes a specific provision 
regarding federal law enforcement use of mobile tracking devices to 
monitor the movement of an individual or object.160  The purpose of 
the law was jurisdictional in nature.  It did not place any expressed 
substantive limits on the use of tracking devices, require the 
suppression of evidence for statutory violations, or provide for any 
privacy protections beyond those recognized under the Fourth 
Amendment.161   
 The ECPA does include statutory mandates requiring federal law 
enforcement to apply before a federal judge for issuance of a search 
warrant based on probable cause or a court order based on a lesser 
standard when it seeks the release of certain forms of subscriber 
information from a wireless company.162  Title III of ECPA establishes 
procedures relating to the use of pen registers and trap/trace devices, 
commonly referred to as a caller identification system, by federal law 
enforcement to capture the phone numbers of outgoing and incoming 
calls.163  In 1994, Congress enacted the Communications Assistance 
for Law Enforcement Act prohibiting wireless providers from 
disclosing “any information that may disclose the physical location of 
the subscriber” based on call-identification information acquired 
through the government’s use of a pen register or trap/trace device.164 
 In 1999, Congress enacted the Wireless Communications and 
Public Safety Act that contains an express limitation on the use or 
disclosure by telecommunication companies of call location 
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information regarding mobile service customers.165  Litigation 
challenging the FCC regulations with respect to the nature of 
consumer authorization required for the disclosure of location 
information has substantially muddled the enforceability of this 
location privacy provision.166  The unwillingness of the Federal 
Communication Commission to promulgate rules aimed at clarifying 
the scope of the statute’s protection of customer location privacy may 
undermine confidence in the little known statutory provision.167  
Despite this continued lack of clarity related to consumer consent, 
United States District Court Magistrate Stephen William Smith has 
concluded that the statute places location information into “a special 
class of customer information, which can only be used or disclosed in 
an emergency situation, absent express prior consent by the customer. 
Based on this statute, a cell phone user may very well have an 
objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in his call location 
information.”168 Despite the lack of clarity in governing cellular 
tracking, these protections surpass the protections for consumers 
utilizing non-cellular forms of wireless products containing GPS 
technology, who are not currently protected by any statutory location 
privacy protections.169  
 The narrow contours of current federal concerns relating to privacy 
intrusions resulting from new technologies are confirmed by the 
provisions of the Video Voyeurism Prevention Act of 2004.170  The 
bill amended the federal criminal law to prohibit the use of cell phone 
cameras and concealed miniature cameras on federal property to 
capture an image of the “private area” of a non-consenting 
individual.171  The law was enacted without congressional hearings 
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and was based on anecdotal evidence regarding the use of the new 
technology to post on the internet sexually explicit or provocative 
images secretly recorded in locker rooms and other undressing 
areas.172  
 In criminalizing the prurient use of new technology on federal 
property, Congress codified a very narrow definition of the reasonable 
expectation of privacy standard:  
A)  circumstances in which a reasonable person would 
believe that he or she could disrobe in privacy, without 
being concerned that an image of a private area of the 
individual was being captured; or 
B)  circumstances in which a reasonable person would 
believe that a private area of the individual would not 
be visible to the public, regardless of whether that 
person is in a public or private place.173 
 The federal codification of this reasonable expectation of privacy 
standard without input during public hearings from those victimized 
by such privacy intrusions, legal scholars, prosecutors, criminal 
defense attorneys, and privacy advocates is indicative of the limited 
legislative concern regarding the impact of new technological devices 
on privacy.     
 In contrast to the congressional focus on the possible capture and 
use of sexual images obtained in federal buildings and parks, a bill 
introduced by Congressman Kendrick Meek on May 20, 2004 in the 
108th Congress to require the designation of a senior official within 
the United States Office of Management of Budget as the chief 
privacy officer for the federal government, as well as the designation 
of privacy officers for every federal department, died after being 
referred to the Subcommittee on Technology, Information Policy, 
Intergovernmental Relations and the Census.174  Under the proposed 
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legislation, the federal chief privacy officer would have been 
responsible for insuring that the technology utilized by the federal 
government did not erode privacy protections.175 
 Congress has also been resistant to enacting legislation aimed at 
placing limitations on the ability of employers to impose electronic 
workplace tracking.  In 1993, the Privacy for Consumers and Workers 
Act was introduced in Congress seeking to set limitations on the use of 
tracking technology in the workplace, including mandating written 
notification to employees regarding the surveillance.176  The bill died 
in committee.177  One year later, in 2000, the Notice of Electronic 
Monitoring Act was introduced.178  The proposed legislation sought to 
amend the ECPA to mandate employers to provide written notice to 
employees regarding employer use of tracking technology.179  
Congress never acted upon the bill.180 
 In the face of federal legislative inertia, along with adverse federal 
court decisions under the Fourth Amendment, it is far more likely that 
varied public policy solutions in the field of privacy and technology 
will be developed at the state level.     
IV.    STATE COMMON AND STATUTORY LAW RESPONSE TO 
ELECTRONIC HUMAN TRACKING 
A.  THE APPLICATION OF STATE TORT LAW 
 Since the 19th Century, various state courts have recognized 
common law invasion of privacy torts that may be applicable to the 
use of electronic tracking devices.  There are four distinct privacy torts 
recognized today in many states: (a) unreasonable intrusion upon the 
seclusion of another; (b) appropriation of another’s name or likeness; 
c) unreasonable publicity given to another's private life; (d) publicity 
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that unreasonably places the other in a false light before the public.181  
Privacy torts grant individuals the right to bring a lawsuit for damages 
usually in state court against the person who invaded the individual’s 
privacy. 
 The privacy tort with the strongest relevance to the use of location 
tracking devices is the intrusion on seclusion tort.182  The Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 652B defines the tort of intrusion on seclusion in 
the following manner: 
One who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, 
upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his private 
affairs or concerns, is subject to liability to the other for 
invasion of his privacy, if the intrusion would be highly 
offensive to a reasonable person.183  
 This privacy tort is not limited to the physical trespass into another 
person’s home or other physical space.  It has been found applicable to 
attempted eavesdropping on private conversations with or without the 
use of technological devices.184  
 The viability of this type of lawsuit challenging the per se use of 
electronic tracking devices to follow another person outside the home 
remains dubious.185  Comment (c) to the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts § 652B states that there can not be liability for observing or 
photographing another person while he or she is walking on a public 
street because the person is not in seclusion.186  
 In 2005, the Connecticut Appellate Court issued the first appellate 
decision considering an intrusion upon seclusion claim based on the 
use of a GPS device.187  In Turner v. American Car Rental, Inc., a 
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rental company had installed a global positioning system in its 
vehicles as a means of controlling and punishing drivers for exceeding 
a set speed limit.188  Under the company’s policy and practice, the 
vehicle’s GPS receiver transmitted the speed and location of the 
vehicle to a monitoring company that in turn faxed the results to the 
rental company.189  In its form lease, the company stated that each 
rental vehicle contained a GPS receiver and set as a contractual 
condition that each time the rented vehicle exceeded 79 miles per hour 
for two minutes or longer, the leaser would be fined $150.00.190  In 
dismissing the invasion of privacy tort action, the Connecticut 
appellate court concluded that it was unaware of any legal precedent 
establishing that the installation of a GPS device in a car violates the 
privacy rights of the driver or that that driver has an expectation of 
privacy on a public highway.191 
 The Supreme Court’s conclusion in United States v. Knotts, that 
there is no reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to one’s 
location while driving,192 led a United States District Court judge to 
dismiss an employee’s intrusion upon seclusion claim against his 
employer for monitoring him through the installation of a GPS device 
in the company vehicle that the employee used during work and 
during non-work hours.193  
 In Illinois, an appellate court affirmed the dismissal of a class 
action lawsuit brought by cell phone users against a large cellular 
phone service company for intrusion upon seclusion based on the 
company providing, to a research firm, specific information regarding 
its cell phone customers, including their names, telephone numbers, 
addresses, and social security numbers.194  The Illinois appellate court 
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emphasized that in order to state a claim for intrusion upon seclusion, 
plaintiffs must allege private facts and that none of the information 
provided to the research company constituted private information.195  
Similarly, an intrusion upon seclusion action in Ohio against an 
employer for videotape surveillance of an employee was dismissed 
because the videotaping was limited to the employee’s public 
activities.196  
 In 2003, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed the 
dismissal of an intrusion upon seclusion cause of action against an 
internet-based investigation and information service company that had 
obtained employment information about the plaintiff’s daughter, Amy 
Boyer, by making a pre-textual call to Ms. Boyer.197  After obtaining 
the information, the company provided it to a New Hampshire man 
named Liam Youens who had ordered it over the internet for $109.198  
After receiving the employment information from the company, 
Youens went to Ms. Boyer’s workplace and shot her dead before he 
committed suicide.199  In dismissing the mother’s intrusion upon 
seclusion claim in Remsburg v. Docusearch, the New Hampshire 
Supreme Court specifically relied upon the public exposure exception 
to the right to privacy: 
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A person’s employment, where he lives, and where he works 
are exposures which we all must suffer. We have no 
reasonable expectation of privacy as to our identity or as to 
where we live or work.  Our commuting to and from where 
we live and work is not done clandestinely and each place 
provides a facet of our total identity.200 
Nevertheless, based on societal concerns regarding the dangers of 
stalking and identity theft in the new technological age, the New 
Hampshire court ruled that if criminal misconduct against a third 
person is sufficiently foreseeable, an investigator has a legal obligation 
to exercise reasonable care when disclosing that person's personal 
information to a client.201 
B. STATE STATUTORY LIMITATIONS ON ELECTRONIC TRACKING 
DEVICES 
 Many states have enacted legislation aimed at restricting the use of 
electronic devices by members of the public and the police.  Other 
states are considering similar limitations on the use of such devices in 
vehicles.202  Most of these measures are aimed at creating new 
criminal prohibitions or procedures and expanding consumer 
protections with respect to rental companies.  Due to the speed of 
technological change, the pace of legislative deliberations and the 
intricacy of the technology, these legislative measures have not 
included responses to human implants and cellular technology.  
Furthermore, state initiatives aimed at regulating location surveillance 
in the workplace have been unsuccessful.203 
  In response to court decisions upholding the constitutionality of 
the warrantless use of tracking devices by police, various states have 
enacted laws requiring law enforcement officials to apply to a court 
for a judicial warrant before installing such devices.  Many of these 
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statutes place specific time limits on the period of authorization.204  
Other states have enacted laws regulating the use of tracking devices 
for criminal offenders subject to house arrest, probation, or parole.205 
 In 1998, California Legislature enacted a criminal statute 
prohibiting the use of “an electronic tracking device to determine the 
location or movement of a person.”206  The statute defines the phrase 
“electronic tracking device” as a device “attached to a vehicle or other 
movable thing that reveals its location or movement. . .”207  The 
legislation contains two consent exceptions: when the owner, leasor, 
or leasee of a vehicle has consented to the use of the device and lawful 
use by law enforcement.208  In addition, California has enacted 
consumer legislation limiting the use of GPS technology by rental 
companies.  Under this law, rental companies are permitted to install 
GPS technology in their vehicles but are prohibited from using the 
electronic data to impose surcharges or fines.209  Similar consumer 
legislation regarding rental companies has been enacted in other 
states.210 
 A recently enacted California law has embraced the use of RFID 
and biometric technologies as a means of reasonably accommodating 
the visually impaired.  Under the legislation, future store point of sale 
devices for the purchase of goods and services used by consumers 
utilizing a personal identification number must have a specifically 
described tactile keypad or be equipped for the use of RFID, 
biometric, or other forms of technologically based personal 
identifiers.211  The use of such technology is acceptable as long as it 
“provides the opportunity for the same degree of privacy input and 
output available to all individuals.”212 
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 Texas, in 1999, enacted a criminal law prohibiting the installation 
of an “electronic or mechanical tracking device on a motor vehicle 
owned or leased by another person.”213  The Texas statute establishes a 
defense against criminal prosecutions for owner or leasee who has 
consented to the installation as well as law enforcement purposes.214  
A defense was also carved into the law for private investigators, who 
after obtaining written consent from the owner or leasee, can install 
the device in a vehicle or a in a private residential property.215  The 
private investigator defense permits distrustful employers, spouses, or 
friends to utilize private detectives and GPS technology to track a third 
party.216  
 In addition, Texas codified restrictions on the distribution of 
biometric information in 2001.  The Texas law prohibits the capturing 
of an individual’s biometric identifier for commercial purposes 
without the consent of the individual.217  The statute also places 
general restrictions on the sale, lease, and disclosure of biometric 
information.218  
 Washington’s motor vehicle law permits drivers, on a voluntary 
basis, to submit biometric information to verify their identity when 
applying for a driver’s license renewal or a duplicate of the license.219  
In crafting the statute, the Washington legislature placed explicit 
privacy safeguards on the handling of the biometric information by 
motor vehicle officials including prohibiting the release of the 
biometric information without court order and mandating other 
appropriate safeguards such as encryption.220 
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 Montana’s statutory limitation on electronic tracking devices was 
not made applicable to the tracking vehicles or humans.  In 1999, the 
Montana legislature, acting based on the perceived needs of that state, 
enacted a law that prohibits hunters from utilizing electronic devices 
“to track the motion of a game animal and relay information on the 
animal’s movement to the hunter.”221 
 The enactment of these laws has led to at least three criminal 
prosecutions against individuals who have unlawfully used an 
electronic device.  In 2000, Robert Sullivan’s wife commenced legal 
proceedings to end their marriage and she obtained a restraining order 
against him.222  In response, Sullivan installed a GPS device in her car 
to keep track of her activities.223  The device was repeatedly installed 
and removed by Sullivan to enable him to download the 
information.224  Sullivan was successfully prosecuted and his 
conviction affirmed under Colorado’s harassment by stalking statute 
that outlaws placing another person under surveillance in a manner 
that would cause serious emotional distress.225  
 In Wisconsin in 2002, a man pled no contest to stalking his former 
girlfriend by placing a GPS device under the hood of her car.226  The 
plea resulted from the police obtaining the electronic records of his use 
of the technology.227 
  In Delaware, Nancy Biddle was prosecuted in 2005 for attaching a 
GPS tracking device to the frame of another woman’s car for tracking 
purposes.228  Ms. Biddle was convicted under Delaware’s invasion of 
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privacy criminal statute that prohibits the nonconsensual installation 
“in any private place” of a device for “observing, photographing, 
recording, amplifying or broadcasting sounds or events in that 
place[.]”229  After reviewing the conflicting federal and state case law 
on the question of whether an individual has a reasonable expectation 
of privacy while driving a vehicle, a Delaware judge convicted Ms. 
Biddle, noting that increased use of electronic devices is eroding 
personal liberty.230 
V.   THE USE OF TRACKING DEVICES IN EMPLOYMENT 
 Increasingly, throughout the United States, private and public 
sector employers are utilizing RFID, GPS, cellular technology, and 
biometrics as a means of monitoring work performance and employee 
location.231  
  In 2004, employers spent approximately $9 billion in 
technological monitoring devices for the workplace.232  The recent 
announcement by an Ohio employer that two of its employees 
received RFID implants may be the beginning of a new ominous trend 
in American labor relations.233  
 In a survey of 24 major federal agencies, the United States 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) found that 13 agencies had 
implemented or had plans to implement RFID technology.234  
Increasingly, employers are replacing traditional time sheets and time 
clocks with biometric technology to monitor their employees’ time 
and attendance.235 
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 Employers justify the implementation of such technology in the 
name of safety, security, efficiency, and productivity.236  However, 
employer use of this new technology does not usually stem from 
empirical data demonstrating an increase in workplace fatalities and 
injuries, or a decrease in efficiency and productivity.  
 As a practical matter, employers already have at their disposal 
many other effective and less intrusive managerial tools to deal with 
safety concerns, security, and productivity: employee training; 
tachometers and odometers to measure speed, distance and mileage; 
intercom, two-way radios and cell phones; and supervisor and co-
worker visual observations to ferret out employee misconduct. 
Electronic location monitoring enables employers to learn non-work 
related information including personal habits, tastes, and interests of 
employees.  In addition, this information can become vulnerable to 
third-party access.237 
 Based on the lack of empirical or anecdotal evidence, there 
appears to be one central explanation for the growing use of human 
tracking technology in employment: an effort by employers to expand 
their power and domination over their workforce.  Twenty years ago, 
Gary T. Marx and Sanford Sherizen recognized that employer use of 
electronic technology for employee monitoring is a modern means of 
implementing the management ideas of Frederick Taylor which are 
aimed at increasing productivity and maximizing employer profit.238   
 In order to avoid the stigma of being perceived as engaging in 
excessive surveillance, some employers will rely on pretexts to justify 
the use of tracking technology.  Pretexts and secrecy are used to avoid 
a perception that the employer is using totalitarian tools or mistreating 
its employees. 
  Prior to the purchase and implementation of workplace tracking 
technology, it is rare for an employer to discuss with its employees the 
purpose and nature of the new form of surveillance.  Without a union 
representing the employees, the employer has no legal obligation to 
discuss or negotiate changes in terms and conditions in employment 
including the implementation of tracking technology.  Nevertheless, 
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advocates for the expansive use of the new technology encourage 
employers to be open and honest with their employees.239 
 An unusual public debate regarding the proposed implementation 
of tracking technology in employment took place in the City of Boston 
in 2004.  On November 8, 2004, the Boston City Council conducted a 
legislative hearing to consider a proposed order to encourage the 
installation of GPS devices on Boston’s 720 public school buses.240  
Councillor John M. Tobin, Jr., as chair of the Boston City Council 
Education Committee, scheduled the public hearing to examine the use 
of GPS technology as a means of keeping track of the location of 
students thereby enhancing their safety.241  During the hearing, 
representatives from the school district, the bus company, and the bus 
drivers union debated the need and rationale for the implementation of 
GPS technology.242  At the hearing, witnesses testified that the school 
district utilized a two-day radio system along with an electronic 
system that kept track of each bus’s mileage and the time when it left 
and returned.243  Supervisory road audits were used to monitor bus 
driver work performance.244  The school bus company representative 
present at the hearing articulated various reasons to justify the use of a 
GPS system: provide back-up information in emergency situations, 
keep tabs on bus arrivals and departures, monitor bus speeds; insure 
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bus drivers’ adherence to set bus routes, and provide guidance in 
following those routes.245    
 In response, union officials and rank and file bus drivers refuted 
these alleged purposes.246  The union president stated that the primary 
purpose for the bus company wanting the new technology was to be 
able to challenge the drivers’ wages, which were based on the specific 
amount of time the drivers worked each day.247  He explained that the 
surveillance system would not enable the company to know the reason 
for a bus delay or the modification of a bus route.248  With respect to 
student safety, the primary reason given by City Councillors for 
supporting the resolution, various drivers argued that GPS technology 
could not provide data regarding which bus a student may be on or 
identify the specific location where a student exited.249  They 
emphasized that the best means of insuring that students get on the 
correct bus and off at the correct stop would be through personal 
supervision by a bus monitor.250  Finally, the bus drivers explained 
that a GPS device, like a two-way radio system, is subject to 
interference and mechanical breakdown. 251 
 Although locating students was the articulated central rationale 
behind the Boston GPS legislation, no one at the three hour City 
Council hearing mentioned using RFID technology as a means of 
keeping track of students like other school districts.252  A detached 
look at the articulated municipal need and the available technology 
should have led Boston officials to discuss the possible use of smart 
cards and RFID badges for students.  The failure to consider the use of 
an RFID system for students suggests that student safety was the 
pretext for the proposed location scrutiny of Boston bus drivers. 
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Alternatively, the lack of a discussion regarding the use of the 
alternative technology may be reflective of an uninformed and reactive 
approach to incorporating new technology in the workplace. 
 Another example of the use of a pretext to justify the installation of 
tracking technology was presented during a 2005 disciplinary 
arbitration when a small marketing company offered GPS data to 
justify an employee’s termination.253  In December 2003, the company 
secretly installed GPS devices in all of its company’s vehicles.254  
During the arbitration, the company contended that the reason for 
installing the tracking technology was to enable supervisors to know 
where to contact employees by telephone.255  The company claimed 
that the secret tracking technology would increase productivity over 
the prior practice of using cell phones or calling work locations.256  
The illogic of the company’s rationale is self-evident.  The secrecy 
connected with the installation showed that the GPS device was never 
intended to be a means of communication between supervisors and 
employees.  Even with the availability of the device, supervisors still 
had to call employees on their cell phones or at the worksites.  
 A far more colorable explanation for the company’s decision to 
begin using the tracking technology was an incident six months earlier 
when the company’s owner discovered that a twenty-year employee, 
who was the subject of the arbitration, was missing at a worksite.257  
Subsequent GPS data along with visual verification demonstrated to 
the company that the same employee was at home when he was 
supposed to be working in the field.258   
 The breadth and secrecy of the company’s implementation of 
tracking technology backfired.  Although the arbitrator concluded that 
the employee was guilty of serious misconduct, the arbitrator vacated 
the termination and imposed a sixty-day suspension based on the 
company’s failure to disclose to its workforce the installation and 
purpose of the GPS system.259 
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 A much more targeted approach to the use of GPS technology was 
utilized by a Missouri bottling company seeking to investigate cash 
shortages from vending machines in a particular service area.260  
Rather than over-reacting by installing GPS devices in all company 
vehicles, the employer placed monitoring devices only in vehicles 
used by employees with access to the specific machines with reported 
shortfalls.261  After the employee was cleared of wrongdoing, he 
received notification that during the investigation he had been tracked 
with GPS technology.262 
 The use of pretext and secrecy regarding the use of tracking 
technology is aimed at avoiding employee opposition.  Based on the 
power of the tracking devices, it is not surprising that it has resulted in 
employee protests and demonstrations against what is perceived to be 
a substantial intrusion into employee privacy.  In Massachusetts, both 
snowplow operators and bus drivers have engaged in collective action 
at legislative hearings to challenge the use of human tracking.263  In 
New York City, cab drivers held a demonstration protesting an 
administrative mandate for the installation of GPS devices in all 
taxicabs.264  It is reasonable to expect larger and more sustained 
protests if employers attempt to impose human implants as a condition 
of employment.   
 Employees and cabbies are not the only people protesting against 
the implementation of tracking devices.  Parent protests in a school 
district in Sutter County, California resulted in the district withdrawing 
its plan to implement RFID tags for the monitoring of its students.265  
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 In addition to overt protests, human tracking can lead directly to 
demoralization, hostility and lower productivity among the most 
dedicated and motivated of employees.266  Under real-time scrutiny, 
employees feel dehumanized and fear being disciplined based on 
inaccurate electronic data or employers misconstruing the data.267  For 
example, after an ABC television station affiliate installed GPS 
tracking devices on the station’s mobile trucks, an unnamed on-air 
reporter was quoted by New York Magazine as stating: “Let’s just say 
people are pretty pissed off…We were never really consulted, and the 
whole Big Brother aspect has us uncomfortable.”268  A Long Island 
snowplow driver expressed similar sentiments when he told a 
newspaper reporter that: “They’re tracking us like we’re 5 years 
old…I’m very on edge.”269  The sense of anger and fear articulated by 
both the television reporter and snowplow driver underscores the 
demoralizing impact caused by electronic tracking in the workplace. 
 In addition to diminishing morale and productivity, 
implementation of computer-based time records has other potentially 
adverse consequences for employers.  Electronic time records can be 
the primary evidence in establishing overtime compensation claims 
under the Fair Labor Standards Act and analogous state laws.  In 
addition, such records may be highly probative in employment 
discrimination and other litigation where the time and location of 
specific alleged conduct, such as sexual harassment, is a central factual 
issue in dispute.   
 At present, employees have few legal rights against the 
implementation or use of tracking technology by their employers 
while performing work duties.270  The scope of recognized employee 
freedoms while at work in the United States is quite limited.  As the 
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United States Supreme Court has observed “[o]rdinarily, an employee 
consents to significant restrictions in his freedom of movement where 
necessary for his employment, and few are free to come and go as they 
please during working hours.”271  
 The Oregon Supreme Court’s 2004 decision in State v. Meredith is 
indicative of the narrow judicial treatment of location privacy for 
employees.272  Sixteen years before, the same court had broadly 
interpreted the Oregon Constitution to prohibit the warrantless use by 
the police of a tracking transmitter attached to a car.273  In contrast, in 
State v. Meredith, the same court held that the use of the same type of 
electronic tracking device placed on the employer’s vehicle used by an 
employee to perform her job duties in a national forest did not require 
a warrant.274  In reaching its decision, the court found that the 
employee “did not have a protected privacy interest in keeping her 
location and work-related activities concealed from the type of 
observation by her employer that the transmitter revealed.”275  
 In O’Connor v. Ortega, the Supreme Court ruled that public 
employees have constitutional protections against unreasonable 
searches and seizures in the workplace.276  The Fourth Amendment is 
implicated only when workplace realities establish that the employee 
had a reasonable expectation of privacy through the use of doors, locks 
and personal passwords.277  The openness of an office to the public 
and other employees may result in an expectation of privacy being 
deemed unreasonable.278 
 In 2001, a federal appellate court ruled that a state employee had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the content contained in his 
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workplace computer.279  In concluding that the employee had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy with regard to the office computer, 
the appellate court noted that that the employee occupied a private 
office and maintained exclusive use of the computer, desk, and filing 
cabinet.280  Even with the establishment of a reasonable expectation of 
privacy, the appeals court found that the search of the employee’s 
computer was reasonable because it was based on the employer’s 
reasonable suspicion that it would uncover evidence of employee 
misconduct.281  
 The O’Connor v. Ortega legal standards will result in interesting 
future legal challenges to the use of human tracking devices in public 
employment.  For example, the Supreme Court’s Karo decision may 
form the basis for a successful challenge to a public employer utilizing 
certain RFID and other internal tracking technology that allows for 
location surveillance in private areas, such as employee bathrooms and 
break rooms, where employees have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy.  Another important unresolved issue is whether the 
application of Knotts, Karo, and O’Connor analyses will lead to 
Fourth Amendment or state constitutional limitations on government 
employers using GPS technology in laptops, cell phones, and other 
devices that would permit monitoring of employee location and 
movement while in the home.    
 In the private sector, the primary national law granting employees 
certain limited statutory workplace freedom, especially the right to 
organize, is the National Labor Relations Act.282  Under that law, 
employers are prohibited from engaging in surveillance of protected 
concerted conduct and are obligated to negotiate mandatory subjects 
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of bargaining with a certified or recognized union regarding certain 
forms of employee surveillance.283  
 The information provided by human tracking devices can be a very 
powerful tool in an employer’s effort to defeat a union organizing 
campaign.  By having electronic access to the location of employees at 
all times, the employer can determine which employees have been 
meeting together during lunch hours and break time and which 
employees have visited the union’s office.284  As a practical matter, 
however, it may be very difficult for a union or employee to establish 
that an employer’s alleged discriminatory conduct toward an employee 
was based on electronic tracking. 
 In September 2005, a New York federal judge rejected a union’s 
effort to vacate an arbitrator’s decision that had found that the 
employer had a right, under the union contract, to install GPS 
technology in company owned vehicles.285  The contract contained 
language granting the employer the right to continually upgrade 
technology it uses and specified certain electronic devices being 
utilized by employees.286  In 2002, the company decided to install the 
GPS technology in company vehicles driven by employees.287  
Employees reacted strongly to the installation of the GPS devices and 
their union challenged the employer’s action through the contractual 
grievance procedure.288  The arbitrator concluded that the contract 
language granted the employer the right to upgrade the technology it 
utilized.289  In rejecting the union’s effort to set aside the arbitrator’s 
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decision, the federal court noted that the contract granted the employer 
expansive authority to update the technology it utilizes.290 
 The National Labor Relation Board’s General Counsel has issued 
an advice memorandum on the question of whether a trucking 
company was legally obligated to negotiate with the Teamsters’ union 
prior to installing GPS technology in company vehicles.291  The 
memorandum concluded that the company did not have to negotiate 
with the union because it constituted a replacement of a prior 
communications system.292  Before the installation of the electronic 
system, the truck dispatcher utilized a two-way radio to communicate 
with drivers.293  Throughout the day, at specific set times, the drivers 
were required to use the radio to communicate with the dispatcher.294  
In addition, log sheets had to be submitted by drivers at the end of 
their shift.295  Although the new GPS technology provided the 
employer with substantially greater surveillance power and 
information than the prior two-way radio, including the ability to 
monitor break times, the General Counsel reached the conclusion that 
the GPS technology was equivalent to the radio system and did not 
constitute a significant change in employment.296 
 The six-year negotiated contract between the United Parcel Service 
and the Teamsters contains a clause limiting the ability of the 
employer to discipline employees based on data collected through the 
GPS device carried by its employees.297  The contract states, “No 
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employee shall be disciplined for exceeding personal time based on 
data received from the DIAD/IVIS or other information 
technology.”298 
 In contrast, despite vocal employee opposition to the 
implementation of GPS technology in town vehicles in Babylon, New 
York, the Teamsters local representing those employees was unable to 
persuade the employer to agree to limitations on the employer’s use of 
the technology.299 
 Negotiated contractual provisions depriving employers of the 
ability to utilize location tracking information in discipline fits into 
what Jeffrey Rosen has labeled the “control-use model” of regulating 
new forms of technology surveillance.300  In light of the employer’s 
power over its employees during work time, a negotiated provision 
limiting the use of human tracking in disciplinary cases is a regulatory 
victory for employees.  It also undercuts a primary articulated purpose 
for using such technology, namely discovering and disciplining 
employees for misconduct.  Nevertheless, this type of negotiated 
language has inherent weaknesses.  It accepts employer electronic 
tracking during an employee’s personal time and does not prohibit 
electronic surveillance after hours.  The provision does not address the 
employer’s use of inaccurate information stemming from improper 
settings or malfunction and does not set any boundaries relating to the 
employer obtaining personal information about the employees’ non-
work activities.301 
VI.    POTENTIAL LEGAL SOLUTIONS 
 Prior to the establishment of potential legal solutions to human 
tracking technology, our society needs to conduct a measured and 
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meaningful debate to reach a national or local consensus regarding the 
acceptable contours of privacy in the new technological age.  Such 
discussions should be aimed at drawing a proper balance between 
liberty, security, individual rights, and property rights.  A 
reexamination of the reasonable expectation test should be explored 
during such a dialogue along with the issue of whether there is a 
societal consensus that exterior exposure should constitute the end of 
protected privacy.     
 Reliance on public fears perpetuated by the mass media, and 
marketing schemes aimed at responding to such fears, is not a formula 
for the development of reasoned public policy.  Similarly, horrific acts 
perpetuated by the use of tracking devices should not be the only 
catalyst for modification of public policy regarding new technologies.  
 Gary T. Marx’s suggestion that the use of new powerful 
surveillance tools may decrease or be modified if managers and 
corporate executives were equally subject to such surveillance remains 
untested.302  Jeffrey Rosen has rejected the notion that ubiquitous 
technological transparency constitutes an adequate or appropriate 
means of balancing liberty with security.303  Nevertheless, those 
advocating for the implementation of human tracking technology on 
others do not necessarily want to be subject to the same level of 
scrutiny.  During the rare public debate in the Boston City Council 
regarding GPS technology in employment, the chief shop steward for 
the union representing the school bus drivers asked Councilor Tobin 
how he would react if his manager or boss monitored his every move 
through GPS surveillance.304  Rather than providing a reflective 
answer regarding his own subjective sense of personal autonomy, the 
Councilor responded angrily asserting that his constituents would be 
able to vote for or against him in the next election.305  
 The question of location transparency for public officials and 
corporate managers remains unexplored.  In developing and 
considering remedial legislation, it may be beneficial for a public 
official to agree to subject him or herself to location tracking for a day 
or week.  A well-publicized experiment involving a public figure 
wearing a GPS device would lead to a greater understanding regarding 
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the power of the technology as well as potential legal changes needed 
to protect individual privacy.  There is precedent for such an 
experiment.  Companies are promoting tracking implants through 
publicity surrounding individuals who have consented to human 
implant.  Public exposure to the results of technological tracking 
would enhance the debate regarding the use of the technology.     
 The negative reaction to the United States State Department’s 
proposed rule regarding the introduction of an electronic passport 
program supports the conclusion that there is growing public support 
for limitations on new tracking technology.  In the State Department’s 
October 25, 2006 report announcing its final rule, it acknowledged that 
98.5% of those who commented opposed electronic passports 
primarily on privacy and security grounds.306  Despite such 
documented concerns, the Department determined that by October 
2006 virtually all United States passports would contain a 64KB 
microchip capable of storing both data and biometric indicators.307  
Cognizant of the level of public opposition, the Department agreed 
that it would not require biometric indicators in the passport 
microchips until after a new rule is proposed and it obtains additional 
public comment.308  
 In May, 2006, an advisory subcommittee to the United States 
Department of Homeland Security issued an interim report 
recommending against the use of RFID technology to track and 
identify people.309  The ability of the government to track and profile 
individuals without notice was one of the reasons for the 
subcommittee’s recommendations.310 
 Based on the slow congressional response to the development of 
new technologies and the current political climate, it is unlikely that 
federal remedial legislation limiting human tracking technology will 
be enacted in the near future. In fact, an explicit policy agenda item for 
the Senate Republican High Tech Task Force in the 109th Congress is 
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to avoid what it has termed premature regulation of RFID 
technology.311  Significantly, absent from the task force’s agenda are 
GPS technology, location privacy protections, and regulation of 
human microchip implants.312  In contrast, in 2005, Congress enacted 
legislation establishing and funding a national RFID animal microchip 
system for domestic pets.313  It is possible, however, that rapid and 
reactive federal legislation regarding human tracking technology  may 
be enacted following  a well-publicized crime or tragedy or due to 
public fear caused by the abuse or misuse of tracking technology.   
 An alternative to emotive legislative responses to important 
privacy issues would be the establishment of a federal privacy 
commissioner or privacy commission, similar to governmental offices 
established in Canada and Australia, to study and analyze new 
technologies and provide Congress with suggested remedies.  
Although Congress did not act on the proposed 2004 legislation that 
would have created such an office, a federal chief privacy officer or 
commission would substantially assist the federal government, 
Congress, and the public in analyzing, understanding, and responding 
to potential privacy intrusions associated with new technologies.  The 
European Union has already created a working group, known as the 
Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, which has closely examined 
privacy and data security issues associated with RFID technology.314  
In the United States, a similar pro-active response to technological 
developments would assist in the establishment of sober and balanced 
federal legislation relating to privacy and new technologies. 
 
 
 
 
311
 Senate Republican High Tech Task Force, Policy Agenda, 
http://republican.senate.gov/httf/index.cfm?FuseAction=PolicyAgenda.Home. 
312
 Id. 
313
 Anne Eisenberg, For the Fretting Pet Owner, a Wireless Distress Signal, N.Y. TIMES, July 
15, 2004, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/07/15/technology/circuits/15next.html?ex=1247630400&en=6
8121d87ca4dd70d&ei=5090&partner=rssuserland; Kathleen Megan, GPS Designed to Find 
Lost Pets, Notify Owners, MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 12, 2006, available at 
http://www.miami.com/mld/miamiherald/living/home/pets/13843615.htm.  The Schering-
Plough Animal Health Corporation markets the HomeAgain pet recovery service that 
utilizes RFID implants. See HomeAgain Pet Recovery Service, HomeAgain Information 
Center, http://www.homeagainpets.com/.  
314
 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Working Document on Data Protection Issues 
Related to RFID Technology, Jan. 19, 2005, 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/justice_home/fsj/privacy/workinggroup/wpdocs/2005_en.htm. 
470 I/S: A JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY [Vol. 2:2 
 
 
  However, it is far more probable that a majority in the current 
Congress will continue to defer to the marketplace for potential 
corrective action aimed at avoiding privacy intrusions.  Such deferral 
is reflective of contemporary deregulation ideology and assumes that 
there is more profit to be made in protecting privacy than in collecting, 
using, and distributing location and other personal information.  
Although voluntary corporate initiated policies can aid in the 
protection of privacy, as well as increase profits through consumer 
good will, sole reliance on marketplace privacy solutions constitutes a 
public policy recipe for disaster.315 
  In addition, sole reliance on litigation in federal courts aimed at 
establishing constitutional protections against human tracking would 
be similarly misplaced.  Based on the reasonable expectation of 
privacy test, along with precedents such as Knotts, it is doubtful that 
the Supreme Court will find that the use of newer and more powerful 
technologies to track public location and movement is subject to the 
Fourth Amendment.  To the extent that new tracking technologies 
involve monitoring within the home, Karo and Kyllo suggest that 
Fourth Amendment standards would be applicable.  However, law 
enforcement and public employers deserve more than post-hoc federal 
guidance relating to the constitutional dangers connected with the use 
of portable tracking devices contained in cell phones and laptops that 
can lead to unlawful location monitoring within a home.  The 
computerized nature of GPS and cellular technology may result in the 
transition from constitutional public monitoring to unconstitutional 
surveillance within a home without real-time human supervision.  
 Since the development of human tracking devices, state 
legislatures and courts have been far more responsive to the privacy 
implications of such technology.  State legislative initiatives have been 
aimed at criminalizing certain use of tracking technology, establishing 
judicial oversight over the police use of tracking devices, and 
extending consumer protections against the use of such technology in 
rented vehicles.   
 Based on the speed of technological change, states should also 
consider establishing a privacy commissioner or legislative 
commission with the authority to study technological developments 
and provide guidance regarding potential state legislative responses to 
a particular technology.  Reports issued by Ontario Information and 
Privacy Commissioner Ann Cavoukian regarding the privacy 
implications of biometrics and RFID technology demonstrate the 
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valuable role that such local government offices can play in 
developing public policy.316  A state privacy commissioner or 
commission would aid in determining whether current state laws 
restricting the use of electronic tracking devices should be amended to 
regulate human implants as well as tracking devices attached to 
personal objects other than vehicles.  States also need to reexamine 
their common law or statutory privacy causes of action to determine 
whether and to what extent lawsuits for damages and injunctive relief 
should be permitted for unwanted electronic location surveillance in 
public or in the home.  In addition, serious consideration needs to be 
given to amending current state law to include prohibitions against the 
sale or distribution of location information to third parties from 
wireless products that are not subject to the Wireless Communications 
and Public Safety Act of 1999.  Similarly, restrictions should be 
explored with respect to the distribution and sale of personal 
information emanating from RFID and biometric technology.  Finally, 
another means of checking the potential abuse of tracking technology 
would be to subject tracking devices to state licensing regulation.   
 The need for careful legislative deliberation is particularly urgent 
in the area of human implants where the adverse social consequences 
of such devices have not been examined.  The use of human implants 
is ripe for abuse and constitutes the most likely technological means 
for imposing geoslavery.  State regulatory schemes and procedures 
have been enacted in some states regarding the implantation of 
microchips in dangerous dogs.  It is a testament to the differing speeds 
of change between technology and the law that dangerous dogs in 
states such as Colorado have clearer procedural protections against 
mandatory implants than humans.317  Although many states  regulate 
more benign intrusions into the human body, such as tattooing and 
body piercing, regulations regarding human implants have not been 
promulgated.  A prohibition or regulation regarding human implants 
should be carefully examined to properly weigh the varying interests 
associated with the technology.  In determining whether to ban human 
implants, an examination should take place regarding whether the 
availability of bracelets, cards, and badges with encoded information 
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meet the same needs as implants.  In addition, the substantive 
distinction between information obtainable from identification-based 
RFID implants and location-based GPS implants needs to be explored 
in developing state public policy in this area.  At minimum, state 
restrictions should ban mandatory human implants without a court 
order following a due process hearing before a state judge with the 
burden of evidentiary proof being placed on the individual or entity 
seeking to impose a mandatory implant.  In addition, states should 
debate and consider legislation banning mandatory GPS human 
implants.  Finally, any state regulatory scheme that permits the 
voluntary use of human implants should require informed consent with 
respect to the nature of the implant, the risk of privacy intrusions 
associated with the implant and the means of removing the implant. 
 In the area of employment, state or local legislative initiatives may 
include a complete ban on human implants, a mandate for informed 
employee consent prior to the implementation of human tracking, 
written notice to employees regarding the surveillance, limitations on 
the daily period when surveillance would be permissible, specific legal 
sanctions for employers who utilize the technology for unlawful 
discriminatory purposes or to intrude on personal privacy, or a 
prohibition against employers sharing the electronic data with third 
parties.  The need for such legislative action is particularly important 
based on the growing portability of tracking devices that enables an 
employer to monitor an employee while working or not working and 
within the employee’s own dwelling.  Such initiatives should be 
considered after careful legislative examination of the technology and 
a determination regarding the scope of protected employee personal 
privacy during and after working hours. 
 To the extent that fear justifies imposing electronic tracking on 
children and infirm elderly parents, a state requirement for judicial 
intervention or licensing may be an appropriate response.  Courts 
already have been granted the power and jurisdiction to deal with 
children in need of supervision and mentally infirm individuals 
needing guardians.  Placing a judicial or regulatory check on 
electronic tracking of children and the ill may provide a balanced 
means of permitting a technological response to rational or irrational 
fears while protecting personal privacy.   
 In the absence of or as an alternative to remedial legislation, 
industry groups and privacy advocates have been working on 
establishing voluntary, industry-wide standards to protect against 
inappropriate intrusions into individual privacy.  On May 1, 2006, the 
Center for Democracy and Technology announced interim draft 
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guidelines prepared by a working group relating to the privacy 
implications of RFID technology.318  Similarly, in the United 
Kingdom, Codes of Practice have been established  for various forms 
of location based services.319  Although “self-regulation” based on 
industry standards and guidelines has some benefits, they lack 
necessary safeguards including enforcement tools.  Nevertheless, 
experiences connected with the development, implementation, and 
application of industry standards may assist in the formulation of 
future remedial legislation.  Finally, another non-regulatory means of 
protecting privacy against human tracking would be modifications to 
the actual technology that may include an ability to turn the tracking 
device off or a signal indicating that the tracking component of the 
device has been deactivated.    
 In conclusion, the explosive growth of human tracking technology 
in the past two decades calls for a deliberative reexamination of our 
society’s concepts of individual autonomy and the scope of protected 
privacy.  The best means of reaching a societal consensus is through 
sober examination, deliberations, and debate with respect to the nature 
of new and developing technologies and the impact it has on our 
concepts of privacy.  Through such a dialogue, an appropriate legal 
framework can be established to insure a reasonable balance between 
conflicting interests associated with the technology. 
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